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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
Attorneys-Violation of Canon 27 by Encouraging
or Permitting Favorable Publicity
Canon 271 of the Canons of Professional Ethics condemns adver-
tising, both direct and indirect, by lawyers. The Canon expresses the
policy that the legal profession should disavow the commercial and
sometimes sensational methods of attracting patronage employed by
businesses and trades.2 A lawyer is an officer of the court, and the use
of commercial advertising is incompatible with his position of dignity
and public trust.' In addition to the necessity of preserving the dignity
of the law as a profession, the usual reasons given for prohibiting
advertising by lawyers are: (1) that advertisements, like other forms
of solicitation, unless strictly confined, are likely to stir up litigation;
(2) that incompetent attorneys might publish attractive advertise-
ments and thereby deceive unknowing members of the public; and
(3) that lawyers would be tempted to hold out unfounded promises
of success in order to secure clients.4
Canon 27 condemns advertising, not publicity. Some publicity is
necessary and helpful to individual lawyers and to the legal profession
as a whole. Laymen must somehow be informed of the presence of
the lawyer in the community and of his skill and integrity; otherwise
neither the lawyer nor the layman can benefit from the former's
specialized training and studies. The lay public demands and deserves
information concerning what lawyers do and how they do it. If such
information is not forthcoming, the profession stands in danger of
being labeled a closed society of necromancers engaged in the practice
of a black and occult art. Publicity-heaping measures of it-is essen-
tial to the lawyer who is a candidate for an elective political office. A
1. The first paragraph of Canon 27 states: "It is unprofessional to solicit professional
employment by circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communica-
tions or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for
professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or pro-
curing his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-
laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are repre-
hensible; but the customary use of simple professional cards is not improper." A.B.A.
CANONS OF PRoFEssioNAL ETmcs, No. 27 (1908, amended 1951).
2. In re Rothman, 12 N.J. 528, 549-50, 97 A.2d 621, 632-33 (1953).
3. ibid.
4. Hewitt, Advertising by Lawyers, 15 A.B.A.J. 116 (1929) (letter to the editor).
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lawyer receives publicity through participation in social and fraternal
organizations, 5 and through public service and successful representa-
tion of clients. Such publicity is proper and will probably result in
the lawyer's gaining new clients.6 But it is improper for the lawyer
to augment this normal publicity by broadcasting his successes
through news media and popular publications.' The legal profession is
thus faced with a difficult and troublesome question: When does
publicity, some of which is necessary and helpful, become "advertis-
ing," any of which is undesirable and subjects the offending lawyer
to the liability of censure by his peers? It is to this matter that Canon
27 is directed.
Two recent decisions, both applying Canon 27, serve to point up the
difficulties involved in this question. In State ex rel. The Florida Bar v.
Nichols,8 a newspaper article was published concerning the respond-
ent, a Florida lawyer. The article covered generally the respondent's
life and career as a specialist in personal injury cases. Most of the
facts in the article were gathered by a newswriter in an interview
with the respondent. The Supreme Court of Florida held: the article
was not "self-laudation" within the meaning of Canon 27 and did not
constitute indirect advertising.
In the second decision, In the Matter of Connelly,9 Life magazine
published an article about respondents' New York law firm. The article
gave brief descriptions of the partners, their specialties, their incomes,
and cases upon which they were working. The article described the
organization of the firm's corporate practice and some of the interests
that had been or were being handled by it. The information for the
article came from interviews with the partners and associates of the
firm. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York held:
the article was "self-laudation" within the meaning of Canon 27 and
constituted indirect advertising by the firm.
The Florida decision' 9 must be regarded as either a failure to recog-
nize the full proscriptive force of Canon 27 or a refusal to make an
unqualified, undiluted application of the Canon to the article under
consideration. The article did mention the success of the respondent's
firm and the skill and dispatch with which it handled personal injury
cases. The court, however, viewing the article in its entirety, con-
eluded that it did not offend Canon 27. The decision appears to be
based upon the following points: (1) the article was primarily a news
5. Note, 7 V~xo. L. BEv. 677, 679 (1954).
6. Di Nmo, LEGAL Em cs 218 (1953).
7. ibid.
8. 151 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1963).
9. 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963).
10. State ex rel. The Florida Bar v. Nichols, supra note 8.
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item and was published only once; (2) the article had a biographical
tenor; and (3) the story was solicited by the newspaper, not volun-
teered by the lawyer." The court also stated as a reason for not cen-
suring the article that it contained subjects upon which respondent
had lectured to bar associations and professional groups. 2 A strong
dissent 13 stated that the respondent had a duty to edit the final
story and to remove any statements that might be construed as
advertising. The dissent emphasized that the article contained
remarks indicating the size and success of respondent's firm, that such
statements were self-laudatory, and that the mere furnishing of such
statements to the press with the knowledge that they were to be
published, whether or not the statements were solicited, constituted
a violation of Canon 27.
The New York court, in the Connelly case, 14 based its holding that
the Life magazine article violated Canon 27 on the following points:
(1) the article discussed cases in which the firm was involved and the
manner of their conduct; (2) the article cited the fees the firm would
receive from handling certain cases; (3) the article gave laudatory de-
scriptions of the firm's partners and mentioned their incomes and the
"blue-chip" status of the firm; and (4) the tone of the article as a
whole publicized the magnitude of the interests handled by the firm
and the special legal skills of the members of the firm.
Existing materials and opinions on the problem of indirect adver-
tising by means of newspaper and magazine articles appear to support
the New York court. One of the leading statements on this question
is Opinion No. 806 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.15 The committee
states that a lawyer should not encourage laudatory statements con-
cerning his professional attainments, nor should he collaborate in
their preparation. A lawyer may, however, furnish to the press
11. Canon 27 condemns self-laudation. It does not qualify this condemnation by
stating that such self-laudation is rendered innocuous when it is bound up in news-
worthy or biographical material.
12. This is fallacious reasoning; there are many subjects that can properly be discussed
within professional circles that would be highly improper if presented to a lay
audience. See Opinion No. 158 of the American Bar Association Committee on
Ethics and Grievances approving the practice of lawyers' names appearing in law
journals in conjunction with legal matters of current interest. The opinion concludes:
"This is not the case of lawyers seeking to have their names extolled in laudatory
accounts of their achievements at the Bar, to advertise their attainments and 'sell their
goods'-a practice which offends Canon 27 and justly merits the condemnation of the
profession." OPINIONS OF THE CoMMrrTEE ON PROFEssIoNAL ETmcs AND GmvANcES OF
A.B.A., No. 158 (1936) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. OPINIONs].
13. 151 So. 2d 257, 262 (Fla. 1963).
14. 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963).
15. OPINIONS OF TH= ComMIrEE ON PRoFEssioNAL ETmcs OF THE AssociATioN OF
nmE BA . OF TmE Crry OF NEw YoRK, No. 806 (1955).
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personal and professional data of a non-privileged nature concerning
his career. He should see to it that the article is in good taste and
maintains a dignified tone. This opinion is of little help. It is to be
presumed that self-laudatory statements constituting indirect advertis-
ing will be wanting in dignity and tastefulness, but the standards of
dignity and tastefulness are too vague and indefinite to serve as proper
guide-lines for the entire American bar. Such standards vary from
region to region, from state to state, and even among members of the
same city bar association. Another view of the matter is put forth in
Opinion No. 423 of the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New
York County Lawyer's Association. 6 This opinion states that it would
be improper for a lawyer actively engaged in practice to retain public
relations counsel to secure press publicity for himself, even though
no mention is made of his legal or professional activities. A more
recent opinion explaining Canon 27 states in part: "When a lawyer
himself writes a book, article or script, the material should not contain
statements which praise or emphasize the lawyer's ability or skills, or
statements which describe the lawyer in laudatory terms or as having
prominent clients or special success in any branch of the law."7 The
opinion goes on to say that what a lawyer cannot properly do himself,
he should not allow or encourage others to do for him.
Two opinions by the Committee on Professional Ethics and Griev-
ances of the American Bar Association indicate the chariness with
which that body regards newspaper comments about lawyers. The
question bringing forth Opinion No. 4218 concerned the propriety of
certain articles and pictures about lawyers specializing in divorce
actions. These articles usually contained laudatory statements about
the lawyers involved. The Committee replied that conduct which
brings a lawyer and his qualifications as a specialist into the limelight
is a form of indirect advertising and is condemned by Canon 27.
Opinion No. 140,19 in reply to a question concerning the propriety of
a news story and photograph of an attorney representing an unwed
mother, stated that it is not professionally proper for a lawyer to
furnish or acquiesce in newspaper accounts of causes in which he is or
has been engaged. A laudatory newspaper or magazine article con-
cerning a lawyer's professional life is, of course, not offensive to the
Canon if the lawyer took no part in the preparation of the article.
Newspaper comments by lawyers are further circumscribed by
16. OPINIONS OF THE ColVmmIrER ON PROFF-SSIONAL ETICs or THE Nmv Yom-,
CouNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, No. 423 (1953).
17. OPINIONS OF THE COM2.n-ER ON PROFESSIONAL ETEcs OF THE AssOc TION oF
T BAR OF TE Crry OF NEW YoPc, No. 859 (1963).
18. A.B.A. OPINIONS, No. 42 (1931).
19. A.B.A. OPnIONS, No. 140 (1935).
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Canon 20,20 limiting comment upon pending or anticipated litigation,
and Canon 37,21 prohibiting the disclosure of confidences arising from
the lawyer-client relationship. Another restraint upon the publicity
allowable to lawyers, though one extraneous to any canon or opinion,
is the attitude of the clients with whom the lawyer usually deals. If
the lawyer's usual clients are conservative business firms or persons
such as those involved in trust and estate work, they will expect him
to eschew any self-laudatory or flamboyant publicity, especially where
their interests are concerned. If, on the other hand, the lawyer's
clientele is made up of persons who desire their lawyer to manifest
the qualities of dash, flair, and showmanship, then he will not feel so
constrained to refrain from self-laudatory publicity as will his more
conservatively oriented colleague.
English lawers have attempted to meet the problem of indirect
advertising by applying one rule to solicitors and another to barristers.
The rule applicable to solicitors is that if the press interview is inspired
by the solicitor, it is objectionable per se. On the other hand, if the
solicitor is engaged in newsworthy litigation, there is felt to be no harm
in having his name mentioned in connection with such litigation or,
with the client's consent, in his giving information about the litigation.
Care must be taken, however, to see that the article does not constitute
an advertisement for the solicitor. 22 The rule applicable to barristers
can be, and is, stricter, probably because barristers do not look directly
to the public for their clients but are retained by solicitors and hence
do not really suffer from the increased restraints on the general pub-
licity available to them. A barrister may not cause or permit to be
published any particulars concerning his life, practice, or earnings at
the bar. He may not discuss any case or other legal matter in which he
is or has been engaged except in legal periodicals. If he becomes a
candidate for Parliament or for a local office, he may not, in his
capacity as a candidate, answer questions put to him by prospective
constituents concerning legal matters. A non-practicing barrister may
write about cases in which he was engaged, using a refined discretion
as to the propriety of the disclosures and being careful not to betray
confidences.23
Canon 27 as interpreted and applied in the Connelly24 case and sup-
plemented by the above mentioned opinions markedly restricts the
material a lawyer can properly furnish in aiding the preparation of a
20. A.B.A. CANONS OF PNOFESSIONAL ETmcs, No. 20 (1908).
21. A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, No. 37 (1928, amended 1937).
22. LuND, A GUmE TO THE PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Am ETIQUETTE OF SoLICrroRs 17
(1960).
23. 3 HALSBunY's LA-ws OF ENGLAND, Barristers § 3 (3d ed. 1953).
24. 18 App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963).
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newspaper or magazine article about his professional career. How
severe are the restrictions? What can a lawyer safely say? The Canon
expressly prohibits two things: furnishing information concerning the
manner in which a case is conducted and furnishing information
relating to the magnitude of the interest involved in a case. The two
remaining prohibitions, the one against the furnishing of information
discussing the importance of the lawyer's position and the one against
"other like self-laudation," are not sufficiently specific to give adequate
guidance to interested lawyers. The Canon itself should not provide
this specificity; it should remain a broad principle against public self-
laudation. Some specific guide-lines, however, must be laid down. Per-
haps the best way to formulate these guide-lines would be to en-
courage state and local bar associations to address specific questions
concerning permissible press publicity to the Committee on Ethics and
Grievances and thereby elicit advisory opinions defining the scope
of the Canon. All possible situations cannot, of course, be covered by
advisory opinions, but there are a number of questions the answers to
which would do much toward clarifying Canon 27: Of how much
importance is the type of publication in which the article appears?
May a lawyer furnish the same information for publication in a popu-
lar article that he may furnish for publication in an approved law
list? Is local custom to be taken into consideration? What if the
comments about the lawyer are only one part of an article about
several lawyers or firms? Should the Canon make an exception for
lawyers who are candidates for the offices of district attorney or
attorney-general and whose legal abilities thus affect their qualifica-
tions for office? These questions are not exhaustive, but they are
illustrative of the large penumbral areas of doubt that must be
illuminated before lawyers can adequately advise themselves as to
what Canon 27 prohibits in the way of unprofessional conduct.
Constitutional Law-Dismissal of Criminal Charges
Because of Deprivation of Right to Effective
Counsel by Eavesdropping
Defendant, upon discovering that sheriff's officers had been eaves-
dropping on his conversations with his attorney,' moved to dismiss the
1. Unable to post bail, defendant, on trial on twelve counts of burglary and larcency,
was provided a conference room in which to consult with his attorney. The eavesdrop-
ping was by means of a tape recorder which had a microphone concealed in the room.
"In this case we must assume that information gained by the sheriff was transmitted to
[VOL. 17
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charges against him. The trial court denied the motion,2 and de-
fendant was tried and convicted. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Washington, held, judgment set aside and charges dismissed. Dismissal
of criminal charges is the only effective remedy for eavesdropping by
police officers upon private consultations between accused and his
attorney, which is prohibited by the tenth amendment to the Wash-
ington Constitution and by the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019 (Wash. 1963).
Those guarantees of the Bill of Rights which are "fundamental safe-
guards of liberty '3 are protected against state invasion by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The Supreme Court of
the United States has held that among these fundamental safeguards
is the right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal prosecu-
tion.5 Although that Court broke away from its own precedent in
1942,6 it reaffirmed this constitutionally protected right as applied
against the states just three months before the instant case was de-
cided.7 Moreover, the right to assistance of counsel has been re-
peatedly held by both state and federal courts to mean effective
assistance,8 which includes the right of the accused to consult in
the prosecutor, since the opportunity and the motive were there and the defendant has
no way of knowing what was communicated to the prosecutor. It is known that, at the
least, he listened to two tapes." State v. Cory, 382 P.2d 1019, 1022 n.3 (Wash. 1963).
2. But the trial court did indicate that, on defendant's motion, it would exclude
any evidence derived through the eavesdropping. Id. at 1020.
3. "Explicitly recognized to be of this 'fundamental nature' and therefore made
immune from state invasion by the Fourteenth, or some part of it, are the First
Amendments freedom. of speech, press, religion, assembly, association, and petition for
redress of grievances. For the same reason, though not always in precisely the same
terminology, the Court has made obligatory on the States the Fifth Amendment's
command that private property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation, the Fourth Amendments prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures,
and the Eight's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963).
4. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
5. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
6. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). There it was held that the sixth amendment
right to assistance of counsel was not one of the fundamental safeguards which are
protected from state infringement by the fourteenth amendment.
7. "We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that
a provision of the Bill of Bights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is
made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court
in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
counsel is not one of those fundamental rights." Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 3,
at 342.
8. Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed in both federal and state courts by
the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments and by many state constitutions and statutes.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 3; Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942); Powell v. United States, supra note 4; Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749
(D.C. Cir. 1951); Neufleld v. United States, 118 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Thomas
v. District of Columbia, 90 F.2d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1937); People v. Caban, 44 Cal. 2d
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private with his counsel before and during trial.9 These decisions have
provided the bases for holdings that the acts of informers 0 and
actions of police officers, such as wiretapping1 and illegal searches
and seizures, 12 were infringements on defendant's right to counsel, and
that the amount of prejudice arising from an infringement is im-
material.' 3 There is also an established line of authority for the
proposition that once an accused has retained counsel, even though
he is not constitutionally entitled to it, and once his case has proceeded
to the immediate pretrial and trial stages, he cannot have effective
representation 4 if he is not allowed to confer in private with his
attorney." Procedurally, habeas corpus,'16 mandamus, 7 order for new
trial, 8 postponement or continuance of the trial,19 mandatory injunc-
tions ° and dismissal of the charges21 have been the remedies available
to a defendant whose right to assistance of counsel has been abridged
by police authorities. The remedies most frequently granted have
been orders for new trial,-' and habeas corpus, 3 both of which afford
the state another chance to convict the accused. It appears that only
434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955); Decker v. State, 113 Ohio St. 512, 150 N.E. 74 (1925);
State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, 9 Okla. Crim. 94, 130 Pac. 962 (1913); James v. State,
27 Wyo. 378, 196 Pac. 1045 (1921). For an excellent review of the development of
this guarantee see Powell v. Alabama, supra note 4, at 58-73. For more recent
discussion of this precise issue see 21 FORDHanr L. REv. 175 (1952); 7 Wyo. L.J. 44
(1952).
9. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959); People v. Sarazzawsld,
27 Cal. 2d 7, 161 P.2d 934 (1945); People v. Boyden, 116 Cal. App. 2d 278, 253 P.2d
773 (1953).
10. Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Fusco v. Moses, 304
N.Y. 424, 107 N.E.2d 581 (1952).
11. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Coplon v. United States, supra
note 8.
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943); People v. Cahan, &upra note 8.
13. "The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to
allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from
its denial." Glasser v. United States, supra note 8, at 76.
14. See note 8 supra.
15. See note 9 supra.
16. McBee v. Bomar, 296 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1961).
17. State ex rel. Burgess v. Riseley, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 186, 1 N.Y. Crim. 492 (1883).
18. State ex rel. Tucker v. Davis, supra note 8; Turner v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 627,
241 S.W. 162 (1922).
19. Mays v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 646, 76 S.W. 162 (1903).
20. Thomas v. Mills, 117 Ohio St. 114, 157 N.E. 488 (1927).
21. Fusco v. Moses, supra note 10. In Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959),
the conviction was reversed and the case dismissed when police illegally coerced a
confession from the defendant who was not allowed to consult with counsel. The
coerced confession, not the denial of counsel, however, was the main basis of the
decision, although Mr. Justice Douglas felt that the denial of representation was the
more important ground for the decision. "They in effect deny him effective representa-
tion by counsel." Id. at 325 (concurring opinion).
22. E.g., Thomas v. District of Columbia, supra note 8.
23. E.g., Yung v. Coleman, 5 F. Supp. 702 (D. Idaho 1934).
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one appellate court has reversed a conviction without remand for a
new trial.24 The vast majority of the courts, however, upon finding
that a defendant has been deprived of his right to the assistance of
counsel under either the federal or a state constitution, send the case
back for retrial.
In the present case the court held that the granting of a new trial
was an inadequate remedy for the deprivation of the right to counsel.
25
Although the opinion is short the decision seems to have been based
on a desire both to prevent prejudice to defendant's right to counsel
and to discipline the state authorities. The court thought that if the
prosecution received information which helped it in the preparation
of the first trial, it would be helped to the same extent in a second
proceeding.26 Thus the defendant's right would be as seriously
prejudiced in the second trial as in the first. Further, the granting of
a new trial would not be a very effective deterrent to obtaining
evidence illegally, since the authorities would have this evidence
readily available to them. The court approvingly quoted Judge Tray-
nor, who said, in a case involving an illegal search and seizure, "it is
morally incongruous for the state to flout constitutional rights and at
the same time demand that its citizens observe the law."
27
The instant decision demonstrates a praiseworthy attempt on the
part of the Washington court to give a more effective sanction to
the constitutionally protected right to effective counsel. Nevertheless,
a number of problems are raised by the brevity of the opinion-
problems which will require that considerable effort be spent by the
judiciary in coming to the best decision in future cases. It was noted
that the decision had two bases: prevention of prejudice and discipline
of the authorities. Is either of these alone enough to require the result
reached in this case, or are both necessary? Pressing deeper, just
24. Fusco v. Moses, supra note 10. There an informer, fearful that his status as
such would be revealed if he did not accompany his fellow employees to their
attorney's office, attended the privileged conference. The court held that the em-
ployees were deprived of their right of effective representation, with the result that
the administrative determination against them was annulled, and that therefore they
should be reinstated in their jobs.
"The right accorded to the petitioners to be represented by counsel at hearings upon
charges filed against them ...involved more than the mere privilege of being accom-
panied by an attorney at the hearings. It included the right to private consultation
with the attorney of their choice free from the presence of an informer ..." 304
N.Y. at 433, 107 N.E.2d at 585. (Emphasis added.)
25. "It is our conclusion that the defendant is correct when he says that the shocking
and unpardonable conduct of the sheriff's officers, in eavesdropping upon the private
consultations between the defendant and his attorney, and thus depriving him of the
right to effective counsel, vitiates the whole proceeding. The judgment and sentence
must be set aside and the charges dismissed." 382 P.2d at 1023.
26. This was under the assumption that the sheriff conveys the information to the
prosecuting attorney. See note 1 supra.
27. People v. Cahan, supra note 8, at 445, 282 P.2d at 911.
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what is the test for deciding whether there was prejudice to the
defendant? Is it whether he had a fair trial, or that he might not get
a fair (second) trial? Or should it be that he must never be able to
get a fair trial in order to secure a dismissal? The instant case seems
to say that when a defendant has been prevented from getting a fair
trial in the first instance, probably he will never get a fair trial, and
thus it is senseless to keep trying him.28 Perhaps a firm statement that
this is the direction in which the courts are or should be heading
would be profitable in future cases.
Another basic question that must be answered is, what is the test
for determining when, and by what method, the activities of the
authorities should be controlled? Should policemen be punished? It
is questionable whether a dismissal of the case is an effective sanction.
Would it not be better to hold the possibility of a jail term for con-
tempt of the legal process over the heads of would-be offenders? In
other words, would not a better solution than the subjection of society
to a proved (but, unfortunately, by illegal means) criminal be to
discipline individual offenders, who were trying to protect society by
attempting to get the criminal off the streets?- The instant case,
while imposing on the state the former sanction, indicates that the
latter method of deterrence is that which is desired. Thus the court
is inflicting on the public a punishment that rightfully should be given
to private offenders. The question really boils down to one of what
to do with a defendant whose rights have been infringed, taken in
conjunction with that of what to do with those who have deprived
him of these rights. What about the other remedies mentioned above?
Why would it not be just as good to allow this defendant to be sent
back for retrial while at the same time punishing wrongdoing police-
men individually? Or must the defendant's constitutional rights be
protected no matter what the cost to society? It seems that if the
courts are to dismiss charges in these cases,30 they should also see that
the offending officers of the law are properly disciplined.
28. Compare this result with that obtained in cases involving an illegal search and
seizure, in which a retrial is not precluded per se; the evidence thus acquired and
other evidence obtained therefrom is simply excluded. Whether or not there will be
a retrial in these cases depends upon the importance to the government's case of the
excluded evidence. See Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 12.
29. On the other hand, could such discipline be effectively administered? Those
charged with enforcing it-the police-are those to whom it applies.
30. Including, naturally, cases of illegal searches and seizures, police brutality, illegal
detention, third degree, and wiretapping, as well as eavesdropping.
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Criminal Law-Credit Card Invoice as a "Security"
under National Stolen Property Act
Defendant, fraudulently using an oil company credit card, forged
the cardowner's name on an invoice which had been imprinted by
using the card. In the course of collection, this invoice was shipped
across state lines to the main office of the oil company. Defendant
was prosecuted in a federal district court for transporting a security
across state lines with fraudulent intent.' Defendant pleaded not
guilty, and the case was tried under an agreed statement of facts. The
sole issue for the court's determination was whether the invoice was
an "evidence of indebtedness" and therefore a "security"2 within the
meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.3 Held, that an invoice
recording a credit card transaction is a security within the meaning of
the National Stolen Property Act. United States v. Mingo, 217 F. Supp.
729 (M.D. Fla. 1963).
A number of cases turning on the issue of whether a credit invoice
is a security have arisen within the past few years and have created a
difficult problem of construing the word "security" within the context
of the National Stolen Property Act. Earlier cases under this act dealt
with such instruments as checks, 4 letters of credit,5 or traveler's
checks,6 which are specifically listed in the definition of a security.7
One of the first cases to hold that a credit card invoice is a security
was Williams v. United States.8 Here, as in other cases adopting this
rule,9 the court relied on the plain words of the act that any "evidence
of indebtedness" is a "security" and ruled that since a credit invoice
records the transaction from which a debt arises, it is an evidence of
1. The act under which defendant was prosecuted reads as follows: "Whoever, with
unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign commerce any falsely
made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamp, knowing the same to
have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited ... shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1958),
as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Supp. IV, 1963).
2. "'Securities' includes any note, stock certificate, bond, debenture, check, draft,
warrant, traveler's check, letter of credit, warehouse receipt, negotiable bill of lading,
evidence of indebtedness . . . or, in general, any instrument commonly known as a
'security' ... 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2311 (Supp. IV,
1963).
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-17 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-18 (Supp. IV, 1963).
4. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 160 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1947).
5. See, e.g., Pines v. United States, 123 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1941).
6. Ibid.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. 192 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Cal. 1961).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Rhea, 199 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Ark. 1961). There
the prosecution was based on defendant's transporting the credit card, which was held
to be an instrument used for making fraudulent securities. A holding that the invoices
made were securities was essential to a conviction.
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indebtedness. The courts which have dealt with this issue are, how-
ever, sharply divided, and the majority rule seems to be that an invoice
from a credit card transaction is not a security within the meaning
and purpose of the act, even though it is an evidence of indebtedness
within a broad interpretation of that phrase. In United States v.
Jones0 the court reasoned that a credit card sales slip is essentially
unlike any of the other instruments" which have been held to be
securities in prosecutions under the act.12 The court continued that
the act's purpose of discouraging the interstate circulation of fraudu-
lent instruments does not apply to cases in which the instrument
crossing state lines is not the sort of paper which, by itself, can be
used to injure an innocent party.13 Other courts have balked at using
the word "security" in a sense which varies so greatly from its popular
meaning.14 The fact that the act itself defines the word will probably
defeat an argument that the defendant was denied due process of
law by reason of the uncertainty of the statute. However, the use of
the phrase "or in general any instrument commonly known as a 'se-
curity'" 5 suggests that Congress in using "any . . . evidence of
indebtedness" may not in fact have meant any evidence of indebted-
ness. That is, the list of instruments stated in the definition of "se-
curity" may have been intended as an elaboration of the popular mean-
ing of that term rather than an extension of that meaning. Although
it has been suggested that a distinction could be made on the basis
of the type of contract under which a credit card is held and the
resulting negotiability or assignability of the invoice itself,16 the cases
10. 182 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Mo. 1960).
11. See notes 4-6 supra.
12. "No authority is cited by the parties, and independent research has failed to
disclose any document held to be a 'security' within the ambit of 2311, supra, which
has not in some general or specific manner called for the payment, delivery or promise
to pay or deliver money or property to the holder thereof, and as to which some
innocent person would be tempted to act thereon in its falsely made or forged
character." 182 F. Supp. at 150.
13. The Jones case was cited with approval in Barack v. United States, 317 F.2d 619
(9th Cir. 1963). Although the Barack court does not absolutely preclude the possibility
of some credit invoices being securities, it lays on the prosecution the burden of
proving that there exist exceptional circumstances or contractual obligations which
would differentiate the instrument in question from normal credit invoices. In reversing
the defendant's conviction, the court said: "Neither the face of the instrument nor any
evidence extrinsic thereto, whether or not within the knowledge of Barack, establishes
that these charge vouchers were intended as commercial instruments which, as pieces
of paper, have value to the holder, giving assurance to him that the papers' very
existence indicates that the debts there evidenced continue to exist." 317 F.2d at 623.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 210 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Mo. 1962). The
court there was especially unwilling to apply an unusual definition in light of the rule
that penal statutes are to be strictly construed.
15. See note 2 supra. (Emphasis added.)
16. See Lewis v. United States, 301 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1962). In upholding a
conviction, the court held that it is possible for a credit invoice to be a security in
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have not been decided on that basis and no court faced with the prob-
lem of deciding the nature of a particular invoice has made this
distinction. The authority on this issue, therefore, remains hopelessly
divided.'7
The court in the instant case follows the reasoning of the earlier
cases which held that a credit card invoice is a security. After stating
in a dictum that the card itself is not a security, 8 the court held that
the invoice is more than a mere record of the transaction and consti-
tutes an acknowledgment of the debt by the holder of the card. The
court placed great emphasis on the fact that a credit card invoice is
the only record of a credit card transaction and hence is the sole
evidence of indebtedness. The only issue dealt with in this case was
whether the invoice was a security, the court assuming that the re-
quirements of transportation by the defendant 19 and fraudulent in-
tent20 were established.
certain circumstances. Since the defendant had failed to object to the prosecutions
pleading that the credit invoice was a security, the court did not need to go beyond
this holding in order to affirm the conviction. Although the court did not say what
circumstances were required in order to make a credit invoice a security, they may
have been thinking of a case in which the invoice itself is assignable and can be the
basis of an action.
17. The extent of this split of authority was shown dramatically in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of California, where, within two weeks,
two different judges handed down conflicting decisions on this issue. Judge Yankwich
held that credit invoices are not securities for purposes of the act. United States v.
Fordyce, 192 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1961). Judge Westover reached the opposite
conclusion in United States v. Williams, supra note 8.
18. "The court has no hesitance to agree with cases holding that a credit card in and
of itself is not an evidence of indebtedness . . . ." 217 F. Supp. at 731.
19. A difficult problem raised by the holding that credit invoices are securities is the
issue of whether a defendant has sufficient knowledge of the workings of the credit
agency to justify a decision that he transported the invoice in commerce when the
invoice was actually sent by the creditor to the agency's central office. The act has
been interpreted to include cases in which the defendant caused the instrument to be
transported in commerce rather than transporting it himself. In United States v.
Sheridan, 329 U.S. 379 (1946), defendant was held to have transported the check
for purposes of the act when he cashed it knowing that it would be transported to
the drawee bank in another state and when it was in fact transported to that bank. In
the case of credit card invoices, however, the defendant may have been ignorant of
the fact that the invoice would be transported in commerce. Few courts have faced
this issue squarely. In United States v. Jones, supra note 10, defendant was an em-
ployee of the company issuing the card and could be assumed to have actual knowledge
of the collection process, but in the majority of cases such an assumption may be
unwarranted. This problem seldom arises in traditional prosecutions under the National
Stolen Property Act, because in most cases the defendant himself transports the
security, and in the case of checks the location of the drawee bank appears on the face
of the check.
20. The problem of whether fraudulent intent was involved in the interstate trans-
portation of a security arose in earlier cases dealing with fraudulent checks. In these
cases, interstate transportation took place when the check was sent to the drawee for
collection. In Kann v. United States, 323 U.S. 88 (1944), defendants argued that,
since they had already received the cash when the transportation took place, the
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The reasoning of the court in the instant case does not eliminate
the basic objections raised in United States v. Jones.21 Since a credit
invoice as a practical matter reaches only the collection office and
the owner of the card and thus is incapable of being used to defraud
an innocent purchaser, the purpose of the act is not served by punish-
ing for the invoice's transportation in commerce. Furthermore, since
the invoice is unmarketable, it is difficult to regard it as a security
even under the broad terms of the act. In light of the growing number
of businesses that use credit cards, some federal regulation of credit
card theft may well be necessary, but this is a consideration which is
properly left for Congress. The process of expanding the meaning
of the word "security" to include a credit card invoice not only exposes
the courts to charges of usurping legislative functions but also creates
immediate problems which could easily be avoided in an act designed
to cope with the matter of credit card theft. These problems arise
from the fact that, in jurisdictions following the rule of the instant
case, the gravamen of the action is the transportation of the invoice-
rather than the credit card itself-across state lines. The conceptual
difficulties involved in holding that the accused transported the invoice
across state lines and that he did so with fraudulent intent2 are among
the problems that would be obviated by basing the action on the
transportation of the credit card.2 Holding the invoice to be a security
also raises problems of administering the law. Although a court
adopting this rule is able to reach all truly interstate crimes of this
nature,24 it is also faced with cases in which the invoice but not the
transportation had-not contributed to the success of the scheme and was, therefore,
made without fraudulent intent. Although the argument was successful in that case,
United States v. Sheridan, supra note 19, limited Kanni to its specific facts and gave a
.broader meaning to the words "fraudulent intent." The thrust of the reasoning in
Sheridan tends to support the decision in the instant case, since the court holds that the
act does not apply solely to the transporting of securities which are still capable of
defrauding innocent persons. The Sheridan case, however, can be distinguished from
the instant case since it deals with the problem of fraudulent intent and not with the
issue of whether the instrument is a security at all. Also the check in that case was
a type of instrument which could be used to perpetrate a fraud, even though the
particular check transported was no longer capable of imposing on an innocent party,
21. See note 10 s'upra.
22. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
23. Although the transportation of a stolen credit card across state lines has
repeatedly been held not to violate this part of the act, a strong argument can be
made that a credit card is a letter of credit and, therefore, a security within the mean-
ing of the act. For an argument that a credit card should be regarded as a letter of
credit, see Note, 35 NoTE DAME LAw. 225 (1960). The insuperable barrier to a
prosecution under the present law is not the requirement that the item be a security but
the requirement that it be "falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited." See note
1 supra. Since the credit card need not be altered to permit fraudulent use, its
transpbrtation could not-hW .rosecuted even if it were held to be a security.
24. It would be a rare' ase in which the credit card crossed state lines while the
invoice did not, but even in such a case a court holding a credit invoice to be a security
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card crosses a state line.25 Thus federal agents, courts, and attorneys
become embroiled in the prosecution of petty thefts in which neither
the defendant nor the credit card leave the jurisdiction and which are,
therefore, easily within the competence of local authorities. If a need
is felt for federal regulation of credit card thefts, that regulation
should take the form of an act of Congress. An act intended to deal
with this issue could eliminate the problems of finding transportation
and fraudulent intent and could put the offense on its proper basis
by punishing only the transportation of the credit card.2
Criminal Law-Rights of Alleged Parole Violator at
Revocation Hearing
Appellant-parolees,1 arrested on parole violator warrants, were af-
forded a hearing2 before a member of the United States Parole Board.3
Appellants were not advised that they had a right to have counsel or
to present the testimony of voluntary witnesses. After their parole had
been revoked, appellants filed suit for declaratory judgment in a fed-
could convict the defendant under the part of the act dealing with the transportation
of tools used in counterfeiting securities: "Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent
intent, transports in interstate commerce, any tool, implement, or thing used or fitted
to be used in falsely making, forging, altering, or counterfeiting any security or tax
stamp, or any part thereof ... shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
2314 (Supp. IV, 1963). Congress cannot be accused of using unduly restrictive
definitions in this act, and a court which holds that a credit card slip is a "security"
should have no difficulty finding that a credit card is a "thing."
25. In the instant case, for example, it does not appear that either the defendant or
the credit card left the jurisdiction after the fraudulent purchase was made.
26. In the typical case of a prosecution for transporting the card itself, the defend-
ant would personally have transported the card across state lines, and the court would
be relieved of making the often unwarranted assumption that defendant was familiar
with the interstate collection process of the creditor. Also, defendant's retention of a
stolen credit card would raise a strong and justified presumption of his intent to use
it fraudulently.
1. These cases arise from eight separate parole revocation proceedings. Because the
basic questions are common to all the appeals, they are consolidated for consideration
en bane.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1958) provides the procedure for the revocation of parole upon
the retaking of the parolee: "A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of
Parole, shall be given an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member thereof, or
an examiner designated by the Board. The Board may then, or at any time in its dis-
cretion, revoke the order of parole and terminate such parole or modify the terms and
conditions thereof. If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so termi-
nated, the said prisoner may be required to serve all or any- part of the remainder of
the term for which he was sentenced." -
3. Hereinafter referred to as the Board.
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eral district court seeking release from confinement on the ground
that the revocation procedure used by the Board was void and illegal.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of the Board. Appellants
claimed that except for a jury, parolees must be given the full due
process safeguards of a criminal prosecution before the Board can re-
voke parole.4 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District Circuit, held, affirmed in part and reversed in part. A parolee
charged with violation of his parole is entitled to an informal prelimi-
nary interview at a point as near as reasonably possible to the place
where the alleged violation occurred, but due process does not require
the Parole Board to conduct adversary hearings in the nature of a non-
jury trial and does not require appointment of counsel for indigent pa-
rolees, confrontation and cross-examination of informants, discovery
of the Board's files and confidential reports, or compulsory process to
obtain witnesses. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Parole was defined at the 1956 National Conference on Parole as"a method of selectively releasing an offender from an institution prior
to the completion of his maximum sentence-a method whereby so-
ciety can be protected and the offender can be provided with con-
tinuing treatment in the community."5 The legislative purpose of the
Federal Parole System is rehabilitation-to restore good-risk offenders
to society.6 Section 4207 of title 18 of the United States Code in per-
tinent part provides: "A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by
the Board of Parole, shall be given an opportunity to appear before
the Board, a member thereof, or an examiner designated by the
Board." The procedural rights to which an alleged parole violator
is entitled at his revocation hearing have been held to be a matter
4. "In essence appellants claim they are entitled to a revocation hearing before the
Board which includes
(a) appointed counsel for indigents,
(b) specification of charges,
(c) confrontation and cross-examination of the Board's informants,
(d) right to examine confidential reports of the Board,
(e) compulsory process to obtain witnesses, and
(f) a hearing held in the district where the alleged parole violation occurred."
Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
5. Reed, Due Process in Parole Violation Hearings, 27 Fed. Prob., June 1963, p. 38.
See DiEssLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 44 (1959) wherein
parole is defined "a treatment program in which an offender, after serving part of a
term in a correctional institution, is conditionally released under supervision and treat-
ment by a parole worker."
6. Neal v. Hunter, 172 F.2d 660, 662 (10th Cir. 1949). See Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304
U.S. 359, 363 (1938); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928). Compare
Woods v. Steiner, 207 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1962), wherein the purpose of parole was
stated to be "to permit a deserving prisoner to leave prison before the expiration of his
term and to serve out its balance while living in the community. Parole is an extension
of the prison walls, an institution intended to achieve maximum prisoner rehabilitation
at a minimal cost to the state." Id. at 951.
[VOL. 17
19641 RECENT CASES
of statutory construction and not of constitutional right.7 The basic
7. Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1961). "It must
be borne in mind in this connection that there is no constitutional right to a hearing
before the Parole Board on the question of revocation of parole. The only reason such
a right exists is because it is prescribed by statute." Id. at 543. See Wright v. Settle,
293 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1961); Francis v. Lyman, 216 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1954); United
States ex rel. Harris v. Ragen, 177 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1949); Fleming v. Tate, 156
F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Woods v. Steiner, supra note 6; Gibson v. Markley, 205
F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Ind. 1962); Hock v. Hagan, 190 F. Supp. 749 (M.D. Pa. 1960);
State v. Meyer, 228 Minn. 286, 37 N.W.2d 3 (1949); Zink v. Lear, 28 NJ. Super. 515,
101 A.2d 72 (App. Div. 1953); White v. Parole Bd., 17 N.J. Super. 580, 86 A.2d 422
(App. Div. 1952); Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correc-
tional Process, 45 MumN. L. REV. 803, 818, 824 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kadish,
The Advocate and the Expert]; Urbaniak, Due Process Should Not Be a Requirement
at a Parole Revocation Hearing, 27 Fed. Prob. June 1963, p. 46; 11 AM. U.L. REv.
95, 96 (1962). Compare Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216 (1932); McCain v. Shepherd, 33 Ala. App. 431, 34 So. 2d 225 (1948).
In Escoe v. Zerbst, supra, the landmark case in this area, Justice Cardozo said by way
of dictum in reference to probation: "In thus holding we do not accept the petitioner's
contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution, apart from any statute.
Probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of grace to one convicted of a
crime, and may be coupled with such conditions in respect of its duration as Congress
may impose." Id. at 492-93. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 1074 (1953). See also
Note, Procedural Safeguards in Federal Parole Revocation Hearings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv.
737, 747 (1963). However recent decisions indicate that due process is applicable to
parole revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960),
wherein the Supreme Court discusses the concept of due process and its application to
government agencies as follows: "'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact
boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual con-
texts. Thus, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations
which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies
use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process.
On the other hand, when governmental action does not partake of an adjudication, as
for example, when a general fact-finding investigation is being conducted, it is not
necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used. Therefore, as a gen-
eralization, it can be said that due process embodies the differing rules of fair play,
which through the years, have become associated with differing types of proceedings.
Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceed-
ing depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved,
the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all con-
siderations which must be taken into account." Id. at 442. Compare Greene v. McEl-
roy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) ("Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in
our jurisprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously injures an
individual, and the reasonableness of the action depends on fact findings, the evidence
used to prove the Government's case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has
an opportunity to show that it is untrue. While this is important in the case of docu-
mentary evidence, it is even more important where the evidence consists of the testi-
mony of individuals whose memory might be faulty or who, in fact, might be perjurers
or persons motivated by malice, vindictiveness, intolerance, prejudice, or jealousy. We
have formalized these protections in the requirements of confrontation and cross-
examination. They have ancient roots. They find expression in the Sixth Amendment
which provides that in all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right 'to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him.' This Court has been zealous to protect these
rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases ...but also in all
types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny." Id. at
496-97,) with Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) ("The
Fifth Amendment does not require a trial-type hearing in every conceivable case of
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
reason for this is that parole is a matter of grace,8 not of right,9 and
the withholding, granting, or revoking of parole rests in the sound
discretion of the Board of Parole.10 The courts, in interpreting the
government impairment of private interest .... The very nature of due process negates
any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situa-
tion ...." [Dlue process," unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' It is 'compounded of
history, reason, the past course of decisions ... .' As these and other cases make clear,
consideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the govern-
ment function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action. Where it has been possible to characterize that private interest
(perhaps in oversimplification) as a mere privilege subject to the Executive's plenary
power, it has traditionally been held that notice and hearing are not constitutionally
required." Id. at 894-95).
8. For criticism of the concept of grace, see Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in
the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 Hauv. L. BEv. 904, 919 (1962); Note, 38 N.Y.U.L.
tuEv. 702, 704-08 (1963).
9. Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949), aff'd without opinion by
equally divided court, 340 U.S. 880 (1950); United States ex rel. MeCreary v. Kenton,
190 F. Supp. 689, 691 (D. Conn. 1960); accord, Vera v. United States, 288 F.2d 25
(8th Cir. 1961); United States ex rel. Holderfield v. Ragan, 170 F.2d 189 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 906 (1949); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1946); United States ex rel. Bongiorio v. Ragan, 146 F.2d 349 (7th Cir. 1945); Woods
v. Steiner, supra note 6; United States ex rel. MeNelis v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole,
141-F. Supp. 23 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Ex parte Harris, 80 Cal. App. 2d 173, 181 P.2d 433
,(1947); Dear v. Mayo, 153 Fla. 164, 14 So. 2d 267, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 766 (1943);
Adkins v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 312, 23 S.W.2d 277 (1929); People ex rel. Castle
v. Spivey, 10 IMI. 2d 586, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957); People v. Thompson, 381 Ill. 71, 44
N.E.2d 876 (1942); Belch v. Raymond, 196 Md. 649, 75 A.2d 96 (1950); State ex rel.
Koalska v. Swenson, 243 Minn. 46, 66 N.W.2d 337 (1954); Zink v. Lear, supra note 7;
White v. Parole Bd., supra note 7; Owens v. Swope, 60 N.M. 71, 287 P.2d 605 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 954 (1956); Ex parte Hines, 289 P.2d 972 (Old. Cr. 1955);
Commonwealth ex rel. Senkovich v. Banmiller, 184 Pa. Super. 592, 135 A.2d 788
(1957); Commonwealth ex rel. Davidson v. Maroney, 177 Pa. Super. 82, 110 A.2d 822
(1955); Beardon v. State, 223 S.C. 211, 74 S.E.2d 912 (1953). Other courts consider
parole to be a privilege, People v. Ray, 181 Cal. App. 2d 64, 5 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1960),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 971 (1962); Ex parte MeManus, 123 Cal. App. 2d 395, 266 P.2d
929 (1954); People ex rel. Kurzynski v. Hunt, 250 App. Div. 378, 294 N.Y. Supp. 276,
cert. denied, 303 U.S. 654 (1937); Rondoni v. Langlois, 89 R.I. 373, 153 A.2d 163
(1959); State ex rel. Alldis v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles, 56 Wash. 2d 412, 353
-P.2d 412 (1960); or a favor, State ex rel. Kincaid v. State Parole Bd., 53 N.J. Super.
526, 147 A.2d 817 (App. Div. 1959); Mahoney v. Parole Bd., 10 N.J. 269, 90 A.2d 8,
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 871 (1952). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 305.6 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962): "Every prisoner sentenced to an indefinite term of imprisonment
shall be eligible for release on parole upon completion of his minimum term less reduc-
tions granted in accordance with Section 305.1, or, if there is no minimum, at any
time. Within sixty days before the expiration of such minimum less reductions, or, if
there is no minimum, within ninety days of his commitment, the prisoner shall have a
hearing before the Board of Parole or a member or members designated by the Board,
or, when appropriate, before the Young Adult Division of the Board. The hearing shall
be conducted in an informal manner, but a verbatim record of the proceedings shall
be made and preserved." (Emphasis added.)
10. United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, supra note 9, at 691. For additional
factors regarding the nature of parole relied upon by the courts in concluding that
there is no constitutional right to a notice or hearing before revocation of parole, see
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above statute, have held: that there is no right to a court trial;1 that
the hearing must be more than a mere formality;' 2 that it must be
provided within a reasonable time;' 3 that it need not measure up to
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act;' 4 that the rules
of evidence are not applicable; 5 and that upon review, a court will
not reverse the Board's decision unless an abuse of discretion is
Kadisb, The Advocate and the Expert, 818; Urbaniak, supra note 7, at 49; Note, 38
N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 708-20 (1963).
11. "A revocation hearing is not a trial, nor indeed is it primarily concerned with
the commission of an offense. As a matter of fact, a prisoner having been granted his.
conditional freedom on parole, the sole question before the Board, the determination
of which may be delegated to a single member or even an examiner, is whether the
parolee, in the judgment of the Board, is still a good parole risk. That determination
presupposes an informal type of conference far removed from the technical ritual of
a trial." Hock v. Hagan, supra note 7; accord, Wright v. Settle, supra note 7; Hiatt v.
Compagna, supra note 9; Christianson v. Zerbst, 89 F.2d 40 (10th Cir. 1937); Gibson
v. Markley, 205 F. Supp. 743 (S.D. Lad. 1962); United States ex rel. McCreary v.
Kenton,, supra note 9; Washington v. Hagan, 183 F. Supp 414 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 287,
F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961); Lopez v. Madigan, 1'4
F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1959). Compare Woods v. Steiner, supra note 6; Martin v.
Warden, 182 F. Supp. 391 (D. Md. 1960); State v. Boggs, 49 Del. 277, 114 A.2d 663
(Super. Ct. 1955); Warden v. Palumbo, 214 Md. 407, 135 A.2d 439 (1957); Hendrick-
son v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 409 Pa. 204, 185 A.2d 581 (1962).,
12. Washington v. Hagan, supra note 11; Gibson v. Markley, supra note 11; United
States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, supra note 9.
13. "Section 4207 in granting a hearing to alleged parole violators, contemplates,
without explicitly so providing, that the hearing shall be held within a reasonable time
after the prisoner is 'retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole.' . . . It
should also be noted that a long delay in time makes it less likely that sources of evi-
dence the prisoner may ask, the parole .board to consider will be available, and that
if as a result thereof the pris6ner is prevented from having the fair hearing contem-
plated by the'statdte, he would be entitled to release." Holliday v. Settle, 218 F. Supp.
738, 741' (W.D. Mo. 1963); ac6ord, United States ex rel.'Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d
534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 846 (1961); Adams v. Hudspeth, 121 F.2d, 270
(10th Cir. 1941); United States ex. rel. Rowe v. Nicholson, 78 F.2d 468 (4th Ciu.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 573 (1935); Gibson v. Markley, supra note 11;'Applica-
tion of Gillette, 175 F. Supp. '255 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Mac Ahoy v. Klecka, 22
F. Supp. 960 (D. Md. 1938). See also Phipps v. Pescor, 68 F. Supp. 242 (W.D. Mo.
1946).
14. 60 Stat. 237 (1946),'5 U.S-C. §§ 1004-06 (1958). "The requirements as to
procedure in the Administrative Procedure Act have no application to the Parole Board."
Hiatt v. Compagna, supra note 9; accord, Washington v. Hagan, supra note 11; Bozell v.
United States, 199 F.2d 449 (4th Cir. 1952); Gibson v. Markley, supra note 11; United
States ex rel. DeLucia v. 0'Donovan, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. IIl. 1948), aff'd, 178 F.2d
(7th Cir. 1949). Compare Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Parole, 409 Pa. 204,
185 A.2d 581 (1962).
15. "It is urged that the board acted, upon hearsay evidence and that the order of
revocation is not supported by evidence. Strict observance of technical rules of law
and procedure accorded parties in a judicial proceeding is not required in such a
hearing before an administrative body. It may be informal and the consideration of
hearsay evidence does not invalidate the final action taken." Christianson v. Zerbst, 89
F.2d 40, 43 (10th Cir. 1937); accord, Lopez v. Madigan, 174 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.
1959); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1946). Cf. Comment. 57 Nw. U.L.
REv. 737, 756-58 (1963).
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shown.16 Until 1959 7 an alleged parole violator in the federal system
was at his revocation hearing' 8 permitted neither to be represented by
counsel nor to have voluntary witnesses appear in his behalf. Attor-
neys or other interested persons could, however, present additional
argument or affidavits in support of the alleged parole violator
at the Board's offices in Washington. Two recent decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia have broadened the
procedural requirements of the parole revocation hearing. Glenn v.
Reed'9 held that a hearing and revocation of parole was invalid be-
cause the alleged parole violator "neither had nor was offered coun-
sel."21 Prior to 1961 the circuits were split on this question 21 but in
that year the Board amended its rules to permit an alleged parole
violator to be represented by retained counsel.22 Reed v. Butter-
16. "The Parole Board may not act capriciously in revoking a parole or conditional
release, but a revocation is within the discretion of the Board. If the Board revokes
upon evidence or information showing a violation of parole or conditional release, it is
not an abuse of its discretion, and the courts will not interfere in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding." Freedman v. Looney, 210 F.2d 56, 57 (10th Cir. 1954). See Moore v. Reid,
142 F. Supp. 481, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956), for a discussion of the appellate courts' scope
of review.
17. Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959), held that appellants complaint,
which indicated that there was no counsel, no advice to appellant of his right to counsel,
and no waiver of the right to appear with counsel and to present testimony, "if sus-
tained by evidence, would undermine the validity of the parole revocation." Id. at 244.
18. Reed, supra note 5, at 38.
19. 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
20. Id. at 463.
21. Accord, Barnes v. Reed, 301 F.2d 516 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Reed v. Butterworth,
297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Hurley v. Reed, 288 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Rob-
bins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Moore v. Reid, supra note 16; Martin v.
United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Cannon v. Stucker,
No. 19, 822, E.D. Mich., June 16, 1960. Compare Fleming v. Tate, supra note 9, and
Woods v. Steiner, supra note 6, and State v. Boggs, supra note 11, and Warden v.
Palumbo, supra note 11, with Jerabek v. State, 69 N.J. Super. 264, 174 A.2d 248 (App.
Div. 1961). Contra, Washington v. Hagan, supra note 11; Hiatt v. Compagna, supra
note 9; Gibson v. Markley, supra note 11; Hoover v. Stevens, No. 20, 349, E.D. Mich.,
September 15, 1960; Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960); Hock v.
Hagan, supra note 7; United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, supra note 9; Lopez v.
Madigan, supra note 11.
22. The Board now provides by rule that: "'All federal prisoners who have been
returned to custody as parole or mandatory release violators under a Board warrant
shall be advised that they may be represented by counsel at the revocation hearing
provided that they arrange for such counsel in accordance with Board procedure. All
prisoners in custody as violators previously given revocation "hearings" without being
afforded the opportunity for representation by counsel shall be given an opportunity
for a hearing with counsel:" Set out in Singleman v. Stevens, 306 F.2d 513 n.1 (6th
Cir. 1962). See Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert, 822 for an account of the re-
versal of the Board's policy. See generally Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert, 803,
825; Rubin, Due Process Is Required in Parole Revocation Proceedings, 27 Fed. Prob.
June 1963, p. 42; Note, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72
YALE L.J. 368, 372 (1963); 11 AM. U.L. REv. 95 (1962); 65 HBMv. L. REv. 1230
(1962); 108 U. PA. L. BEV. 423 (1960).
[VOL. 17
1964] RECENT CASES
worth23 held that a hearing and revocation of parole were invalid
because the alleged parole violator was prevented from presenting
the testimony of voluntary witnesses.24 On the other hand, it has been
held that an alleged parole violator is entitled neither to confront and
cross-examine his accusers 25 nor to have counsel assigned to him at
his parole revocation hearing.
The majority in the instant case stated that the Board was estab-
lished "to administer the parole system as a part of the program to
rehabilitate federal prisoners and restore them to useful membership
in society."2 7 The procedural safeguards urged by the appellants,
were held not to be commanded by either the parole statute, the
Administrative Procedure Act, or the Constitution. The court held
the parole statute inapplicable, analogizing the court procedures
thereunder to probation revocation, the most comparable legal pro-
23. 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
24. "There is no reason why the Parole Board should decline to hear either counsel
or voluntary witnesses if they appear of their own motion." Martin v. United States
Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.D.C. 1961); contra, Gibson v. Markley, supra
note 11; Poole v. Stevens, 190 F. Supp. 938 (E.D. Mich. 1960); United States ex rel.
McCreary v. Kenton, supra note 9.
25. "Revoking of parole, like the granting of it in the first instance, is not, under the
statutes, intended to be determined by means of the full-dress adversary proceedings
of a trial [see note 13 supraj with right to counsel, right to summon witnesses, right
of confrontation, etc. The words 'opportunity to appear' do not call for a hearing of
this sort. It is not lack of administrative due process that the prisoner is not entitled
to have witnesses summoned and heard or that he may not appear with counsel. If
changes are to be made to permit them, Congress and not the courts should make the
appropriate changes." United States ex rel. McCreary v. Kenton, supra note 9, at 691;
accord, Gibson v. Markley, supra note 11. "It would seem that the right to confront
accusers and cross-examine them is similarly not applicable to such hearings." Id. at
743. See Note, Procedural Safeguards in Federal Parole Revocation Hearings, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 737, 754-56 (1963) which suggests that confrontation and cross-examination
are procedural safeguards guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Compare Petition of
Vaughn, 371 Mich. 386, 124 N.W.2d 251 (1963), construing a statute which gave the
alleged parole violator, under certain circumstances, the right to meet the witnesses who
are produced against him.
26. "Consequently the plaintiff is not entitled to have counsel assigned to him at a
new hearing before the Parole Board if he chooses to take advantage of an opportunity
that is being extended to him for a new hearing. I may add that as a practical matter
it is not feasible to assign counsel in these matters. Most Federal penitentiaries, except
perhaps Atlanta and Alcatraz are located away from large centers of population. Very
few lawyers would be available for assignment, and if it were necessary to assign
counsel for those hearings the burden on the local bar, which is invariably small, would
be intolerable." Martin v. United States Bd. of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542, 543 (D.D.C.
1961); accord, Moore v. Reid, supra note 16 (dictum). Compare Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Fleming v. Tate, supra note 9 (dictum). Cf. Comment,
Procedural Safeguards in Federal Parole Revocation Hearings, 57 Nw. U.L. 1IEv. 737,
758-60 (1963); Note, Freedom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72
YALE LJ. 368, 374 (1962).
27. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
28. See note 4 supra.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
deeding, in which procedural safeguards do not apply,9 and to a
state judge's use of out-of-court information to assist him in the exer-
cise of his discretion.30 The Administrative Procedure Act was held
inapplicable because "the Board does not adjudicate, nor is it required
to hold hearings, in the sense that those words are employed in the
Administrative Procedure Act."31 The sixth amendment was held in-
applicable because the "Sixth Amendment by its terms governs only
'criminal prosecutions."' 32 The court said that, assuming that the
various requirements of the sixth amendment are included in the due
process restrictions of the fifth amendment, as argued by the appel-
lants,33 due process does not require appointment of counsel for indi-
gent parolees,34 confrontation and cross-examination of the Board's
informants,35 access to the Board's ffles,36 or right to compulsory proc-
ess.37 One exception was made: The court held that the preliminary
29. See Escoe v. Zerbst, supra note 7; Bums v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
"Congress, which is the source of both of these penological devices has given no indi-
cation that the revocation of parole should be more difficult or procedurally different
than the revocation of probation." 318 F.2d at 236.
30. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), wherein the Supreme Court
upheld a death sentence imposed by a state court on the basis of "information supplied
by witnesses with whom the accused had not been confronted and as to whom he had
no opportunity for cross-examination or rebuttal." Id. at 243.
31. 318 F.2d at 237.
32. Ibid. See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). Compare Levine v.
United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); Strickland v. United States, 114 F.2d 556 (4th
Cir. 1940).
33. 318 F.2d at 237.
34. The court pointed out that "Congress has not authorized the Parole Board to
appoint counsel for indigent parolees appearing before it and that Congress has not
empowered the federal courts to make such appointments." Id. at 238. The court
distinguished the Coppedge case, supra note 26, by saying that there "the Supreme
Court did not place an indigent's right to counsel and a free transcript in judicial
proceedings on any command of the Constitution, but more narrowly on its interpreta-
tion of a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915." 318 F.2d at 238. The court also mentioned the
fact that "no case has yet held that an interested party in an administrative or regula-
tory proceeding is intitled to be furnished with counsel if he cannot afford one of his
own ".hoice." Ibid.
35. The court reasoned that the "parole revocation process is neither a 'criminal
prosecution' nor an adversary proceeding in the usual sense of that term. The primary
issue before the Board is: Has the parolee violated a condition of his parole? Even if
this determination is adverse to the parolee the Board has discretion to continue his
parole notwithstanding a violation." Ibid. The court distinguished Greene v. McElroy,
supra note 7, on the ground that "there are obvious factual distinctions between at-
tempted governmental action which destroyed the means of livelihood of an engineer
employed by a private contractor and governmental relations with a convicted prisoner
released subject to certain conditions before completing a sentence imposed after full
due process criminal trial." 318 F.2d at 239.
36. On this point the court briefly remarked: "In light of our view of the purpose
of parole and of the revocation process, we hold that appellants are not entitled to
discovery of the Board's files." Ibid.
37. The court pointed out that "Congress has not invested the Parole Board with
subpoena power and that this important power is not an inherent attribute of agency
authority," ibid.; that "the Parole Board is not bound by the rules of evidence in con-
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interview,38 "in order to meet standards of fairness inherent in the
congressional scheme of parole, be conducted at or reasonably near
the place where the alleged parole violation occurred, or the place of
the violation chiefly relied upon, and as promptly as is convenient
after the arrest while the information is likely to be fresh and the
sources are available." 39
The three dissenting opinions are important and should be consid-
ered. Dissenting in part, on constitutional grounds, Chief Justice
Bazelon and Justice Edgerton, applying the principles enunciated in
Greene v. McElroy4 and relying upon the discussion of due process
in Hannah v. Larche,41 argued that the denial of the traditional safe-
guards of confrontation, cross-examination, and inspection raised
serious constitutional questions, that Congress had not explicitly au-
thorized the Parole Board to conduct parole revocation proceedings
without these traditional safeguards, and that therefore "the Parole
Board has no authority to conduct parole revocation proceedings with-
out these traditional safeguards."4 They also argued that the parole
statute should be construed to provide for appointment of counsel for
indigent parolees.43 Justice Fahy, dissenting in part, on statutory
grounds, argued that section 4205 of title 18 of the United States
sidering information relating to parole violation," id. at 240; and that to hold otherwise
would be to "imply that revocation hearings are comparable to criminal prosecutions
rather than to administrative processes within the framework of prisoner rehabilitation
and penal administration." Ibid.
38. The preliminary interview is "a first step toward a tentative evaluation of what
the parolee wishes to offer by way of explanation of his conduct." Id. at 243.
39. Id. at 243-44. But if the parolee does elect to present evidence contesting the
alleged parole violation at this preliminary interview, "the Board may in its discretion
dispense with a hearing at the prison." Id. at 244. The Board will, however, still
consider affidavits and letters in support of the parolee's contentions submitted after the
preliminary interview.
40. 360 U.S. 474 (1959). See note 7 supra.
41. 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See note 7 supra. Justices Bazelon and Edgerton here
concluded: "A parole revocation seems to us more like a 'binding [determination] which
directly affect[s] the legal rights of individuals' than 'a general fact finding investiga-
tion.' It seems to follow that the traditional safeguards are required." 318 F.2d at 252.
42. Ibid. They distinguished the procedures used by a sentencing judge and in
revoking probation on the ground that there neither specific facts nor a specific viola-
tion need be found. Id. at 252-53. As to the question of whether or not a parole
revocation proceeding is an adversary proceeding they said: "[W]hatever general
philosophy underlies parole revocation, when the Board tells a parolee that he has done
a specific act for which his parole may be revoked, and he denies it, there are 'adverse,
conflicting objectives,' not 'genuine identity of interest,' at least in regard to the
specific issue in dispute." Id. at 253.
43. "Poverty bears no more relationship to the question of parole violation than to
the question of guilt. Therefore congressional discrimination against parolees who
cannot afford counsel would raise serious problems of due process of law. To avoid
such problems we should construe the statue to provide for the appointment of counsel
for such parolees." Id. at 255.
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Code4 required that a semi-formal 45 hearing be held to determine
whether a violation of parole had occurred before a warrant could be
issued or the parolee retaken.46 Justice Wright, also dissenting in part,
argued that while a hearing should be held before the warrant is
issued, this hearing should be "non-adversary and relatively infor-
mal."47
The court reached the proper result in the instant case. As was
pointed out in Hannah v. Larche,48 due process is not an inflexible
concept. Although present in parole revocation proceedings, its re-
quirements are less stringent there than in a criminal prosecution, in
which the adjudication directly affects the rights of heretofore totally
free men. Indeed, it would appear that, in the case of the parole
revocation proceeding, the requirements of due process are, in fact,
less rigorous than those of the parole statute. To adopt the minority's
views, while not affecting or limiting the discretion of the Board as
feared by some authorities,49 would impose a heavy burden upon the
Board. Justice Washington adequately summed up the significance
of the instant case in his concurring opinion: "[The opinion] repre-
sents an important step forward, yet does not impose requirements
so onerous as to endanger the fulfillment of the salutary objectives
for which Congress has created the Board of Parole." 0 It is sub-
mitted, however, that the Board should consider the feasibility of
adopting Justice Wright's suggestions that a probation officer be ap-
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1958) provides in part: "A warrant for the retaking of any
United States prisoner who has violated his parole, may be issued only by the Board
of Parole or a member thereof and within the maximum term or terms for which he
was sentenced."
45. "At the hearing he should have the opportunity to be beard in person and to
present witnesses, to bring counsel to assist him, and to have access to, and, on request,
confrontation, of the sources of information as to the alleged violation, with right of
cross-examination." 318 F.2d at 259. Justice Fahy concluded: "While due process
is required, this does not as a rule for parole violation call for a procedure broken
down into the right to have counsel appointed, or to have compulsory process. If,
however, these appear in a particular case to be essential to the reaching of a fair
and reasonable result by the Board the Board may not validly act without them." Id.
at 200.
46. Id. at 258.
47. Id. at 261-62. Justice Wright also suggested three other changes. First, if the
parolee denies the charges and is not represented by counsel, a probation officer should
be appointed pursuant to sections 3655 of title 18 of the United States Code, which
authorizes The Attorney General to assign probation officers "duties with respect to
persons on parole," to assist the parolee in his defense. Second, if witnesses for the
parolee prefer not to appear at the hearing, a probation officer should interview them
and file summaries of the interviews in evidence. Third, the right of confrontation
should be extended to the parolee. The reason for the latter change is that "this right
is basic to fairness in any type of hearing where personal liberty is involved." Ibid.
48. 363 U.S. 420 (1960). See note 7 supra.
49. Reed, supra note 5, at 40-41.
50. 318 F.2d at 247.
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pointed (1) to assist an indigent parolee in his defense, and (2) to
interview those witnesses of the parolee who refuse to appear at the
hearing and file in evidence summaries of those interviews. The ap-
pointment of a probation officer to assist the indigent parolee in his
defense would assure that the parolee appreciates the nature and sig-
nificance of the hearing. The appointment of a probation officer to
interview reluctant witnesses would assure that all testimony favora-
ble to the parolee's position is presented before the Board for con-
sideration. The adoption of these procedures therefore, while not
imposing onerous obligations on the Board, would provide the same
type of protection as guaranteed by the due process clause.
Labor Law-Federal Procedure-Right to Jury Trial
under Section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act
The Secretary of Labor of the United States brought an action in a
federal district court in Georgia under section 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,1 against Alapaha Yellow Pine Products, Inc. In addition
to seeking an injunction to restrain violations of the shipping, mini-
mum wage, overtime, and bookkeeping provisions of the act,2 plain-
tiff asked the court to exercise the jurisdiction recently conferred
upon it by Congress3 to restrain defendant from withholding payment
to his employees of the difference between statutory minimum wages
or overtime compensation and the lower wages which the defendant
had paid in violation of the act. The seeking of this latter injunctive
relief prompted defendant to demand a jury trial on all issues of fact
as made by the pleadings.4 Defendant contended that for the court
to exercise this newly granted jurisdiction without submitting issues
of fact to a jury constituted a denial of the right to jury trial guaran-
teed by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution.5
Held, motion to strike demand for jury granted. No right to a jury
trial exists in a suit by the Secretary of Labor under section 17 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to restrain withholding of pay due em-
ployees under the act; the suit asserts a statutory claim rather than
a common law claim. Wirtz v. Alapaha Yellow Pine Products, Inc.,
1. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
2. 52 Stat. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1958).
3. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (Supp. IV 1961).





217 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Ga. 1963).
The right to a jury trial in civil actions in federal courts is guaran-
teed by the seventh amendment to the United States Constitution "in
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars .... -6 In deciding what proceedings are to be deemed
suits at common law the courts have been guided almost entirely
by historical considerations. 7 The basis of this approach is that the
purpose of the seventh amendment was to preserve the right to trial
by jury as it existed under the English common law when the amend-
ment was adopted. Therefore its protection is afforded only in suits
similar to those triable by jury in 1791. Since at that time it was
settled that there was no right to a jury in equity and admiralty the
amendment does not apply to such actions. Neither does it apply to
certain statutory actions and other proceedings unknown to the com-
mon law.8 Thus, to determine whether in a particular case there
exists a constitutional right to jury, a federal court must determine
whether the proceeding is in the nature of a suit in which at early
common law litigants had the right to a jury trial. Because of the
historical denial of a jury in equity, litigants in suits brought by the
Secretary of Labor to restrain violations of the Fair Labor Standards
Act have consistently been denied a jury on the grounds that the
injunctive relief sought was equitable.9
In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the proce-
dural differences between equitable suits and legal actions. 10 Thus in
the same suit a federal court has both legal and equitable jurisdiction.
However, a litigant before the court still has a right to a jury trial on
legal issues, even though such issues are combined with equitable
issues. Two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court, Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westoveri1 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,12 have
made it explicitly clear that a litigant does not lose his right to a
jury trial by combining a claim based upon a legal issue with a plea
for equitablg relief.13
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
7. RoTTscE kEFIR, A m cN CONSTr'uxIoNAL LAW 866 (1939).
8. Id. at 866-67.
9. Mitchell v. Independent Stave Co., 159 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Mo. 1957); Tobin
v. Abelson, 103 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor
Co., 52 F. Supp. 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); Fleming v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 38 F.
Supp. 1001 (W.D. La. 1941).
10. "The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the
Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate." FED. R. Crv. P. 38(a); Conn v. Kohlemann, 2 F.R.D. 514 (E.D.
Pa. 1942); see 5 Mooir, FEDERaAL PRACTICE § 38.07(1), at 39 (2d ed. 1951).
11. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
12. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
13. Id. at 470. "It would make no difference if the equitable cause clearly out-
weighed the legal cause so that the basic issue of the case taken as a whole is
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The recovery of back wages and overtime has had an interesting
history. In the original 1938 Act there was no mention as to whether
reimbursement of this compensation to employees was permissible
in suits by the Secretary to restrain violations of the act. United
States courts of appeal differed on the availability of such relief.' 4 The
Supreme Court did not pass on the issue directly but did say in
McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co.15 that a district court had the
power to enforce its injunctive decree for compliance with the act by
requiring a civil contempt to be purged by the employer's paying
to his employees the back wages and overtime due them.16 In 1949,
Congress amended section 17 of the act to provide that the employees
could recover back wages and overtime only by suing their employer
themselves or by requesting the Secretary to sue in a separate suit
under section 16(b). 17 In such a suit the names of the complaining
employees had to be revealed to the employer. Then in 1961, after
the Department of Labor brought to the attention of Congress that
few such suits were being instigated by the employees because of
feared reprisals,18 Congress again amended the act. That amendment
granted district courts jurisdiction to restrain withholding of back
wages and overtime when such relief was prayed for in a suit by the
Secretary to restrain violations of the Act.'9 The Secretary can now
seek such relief for the employees without obtaining their consent to
the suit.
When employees have sued for their back pay such suits have been
deemed to be at law for breach of the employment contract. Olear-
chick v. American Steel Foundries2 was the first case dealing with
the right to a jury in a wage-overtime suit brought by employees.
There the court granted a jury trial, holding that the claim is "nothing
more than a money judgment which is sought against each of the
defendants based upon the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. [This is] an action in assumpsit, on contract, at law."21 A later
Fifth Circuit case, Lewis v. Time Publishing Co.,z2 held that denial
equitable. As long as any legal cause is involved the jury rights it creates control. This
is the teaching of Beacon Theatres, as we construe it." Thermo-Stitch, Inc. v. Chemi-
Cord Processing Corp., 294 F.2d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1961).
14. McComb v. Frank Scerbio & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949) (district
courts have power to order reimbursement to employees); Walling v. Crane, 158 F.2d
80 (5th Cir. 1946) (district courts have no power to order reimbursement to em-
ployees).
15. 336 U.S. 187 (1949).
16. Id. at 193-94.
17. 63 Stat. 919 (1949).
18. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-42 (1961).
19. 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 217 (Supp. IV 1961).
20. 73 F. Supp. 273 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
21. Id. at 280.
22. 185 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1950).
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of a jury in such a suit was reversible error. The first case ruling on
the jury issue after the 1961 amendment was Goldberg v. A. G.
Wimpy Co.,m where the court denied an employer a jury trial, resting
its decision upon the grounds that "the Seventh Amendment has no
application . . . where recovery of money damages is sought as an
incident to injunctive relief."
The court in the instant case answered the defendant's argument
that its constitutional right to a jury had been violated by relying on
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,m which held that the seventh
amendment "has no application to cases where recovery of money
damages is an incident to equitable relief even though damages might
have been recovered in an action at law .... It does not apply where
the proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law."2 The
court distinguished cases such as Beacon Theatres27 and Dairy Queen8
by pointing out that in those cases the plaintiffs had an existent right
to a jury upon a legal issue.
In the case at bar neither the Secretary nor the employees have any
common law cause of action. They do have a statutory cause of action for
unpaid statutory amounts, but the statute enables and empowers the district
courts sitting as courts of equity to order the payment of back wages in
relief of violation of §§ 6 and 7 of the Act, as a sort of legislative sanction.
29
The decision in the instant case is based on the ground that the
Secretary's claim on behalf of the employees was one unknown to the
common law since it was created by statute. However, not all statu-
torily authorized actions are without the scope of the seventh amend-
ment. ° The test is whether a statutory action can be analogized to
a common law cause of action for which there was a right to jury trial
at the time of the adoption of the amendment. If so, then that right
cannot be dispensed with.3 The court's reliance on Jones & Laughlinm
23. 46 CCH Lab. Cas. ff 31344 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
24. lbid.
25. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
26. Id. at 48.
27. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
28. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
29. 217 F. Supp. at 470-71.
30. 5 Moons, op. cit. supra note 20, § 38.11(7). As was said in United States v.
Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950), "It is my thought that when a federal statute
embraces a common-law form of action, that action does not lose its identity merely
because it finds itself enmeshed in a statute. The right of trial by jury in an action
for debt still prevails whatever modem name may be applied to the action." Id. at
986. The court was speaking there of an action to recover treble damages in an anti-
trust suit.
31. 5 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 20, § 38.11(7); 4 VAis'. L. Rtv. 170, 172 (1950).
For a detailed historical review of the requirement that a suit be of the nature of a
suit at common law, see People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal. 2d 283, 231 P.2d
832 (1951).
32. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
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is misplaced. In the light of Beacon Theatres33 and Dairy Queene it
can no longer be said that the seventh amendment "has no application
to cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable
relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action
at law."' At the present time it is clear that the merger in one suit
of legal and equitable issues does not eradicate the right to a jury
trial on the legal issue. However, the Supreme Court's holding in
Jones & Laughlin that the amendment "does not apply where the
proceeding is not in the nature of a suit at common law"36 is still a
correct expression of the law. It should be noticed that in Jones &
Laughlin the statute authorized an administrative board to order
reinstatement of employees who were discharged because of their
union activity and to direct payment of wages for time lost by the
discharge.37 No such similar action or relief was known at common
law. However, such an action as that involved in the instant case can
be analogized to the common law action of assumpsit, which was an
action for the recovery of damages for the nonperformance of a con-
tract, express or implied.- In such an action there existed a right to
jury trial.3 Because this analogy can be made, the court in the instant
case has wrongfully precluded defendant from a jury trial.40 A decision
handed down subsequent to the instant case came to this conclusion in
a similar suit.41 Furthermore, a finding that the act was violated is
33. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
34. 369 U.S. 469 (1952).
35. 301 U.S. at 48.
36. Ibid.
37. 301 U.S. at 47.
38. "The action of assunpsit . . . is so called from the word 'assumpsit' (he under-
took, or he promised), which, when the pleadings were in Latin, was inserted in the
declaration as descriptive of the defendant's undertaking. It is a proper remedy for
the breach of any simple or unsealed contract, whether the contract is verbal or
written, express or implied, and whether it is for the payment of money, or for the
performance of some other act, as to render services or deliver goods, or for the
forbearance to do some act. In no case will the action lie unless there has been
an actual contract or promise, or unless the law will imply one; for a promise either
given in fact or implied by law is essential." SinumN, COMMON LAw PLEADING §
58, at 148 (3d ed. 1923); see MORGAN & DwYER, Tm STUDY OF LAW 107 (1948);
see also 4 WoRns & PmRAsFs 601 (1940) and cases cited therein.
39. MORGAN & DwYva, op. cit. supra note 38, at 109; MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10,
§ 38.27, at 208.
40. It might be possible to analogize this claim for back wages and overtime to other
common law forms of action such as debt or debt on a statute. See SHnPMAN, op. cit.
supra note 38, §§ 152-53; MORGAN & DwYER, op. cit. supra note 38, at 94. However,
the most analogous common law form is that of assumpsit. As was pointed out in
footnote 38, for the action to lie it is essential that the promise sued upon be given
in fact or implied by law. In the instant case the employer-defendant did not promise
to pay his employees the minimum wage but since the statute required such payment
the law will imply a promise. Thus the Secretary is suing the employer to recover
back wages and overtime for the employer's breach of his implied promise to pay the
legal minimum wage.
41. Wirtz v. Thompson Packers, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. La. 1963).
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necessary to give the Secretary standing to sue for unpaid minimum
wages and overtime compensation for the employees, therefore, the
entire case should be tried by a jury to prevent collateral estoppel
from applying to the legal issue, as it would if the judge first decided,
as it necessarily would have to, whether the act had been violated.
Although much has been said here regarding the principles of
constitutional law which should guarantee the right to jury trial in
these wage-overtime suits, it is submitted that here is one case where
the mechanical application of the Constitution may thwart the main
purpose of some much needed legislation. The 1961 amendment
allowed the Secretary to join with his suits for injunctive relief to
restrain violations of the act these requests for back pay. The need
for such action was revealed by a report which stated that in 1960
an estimated thirty million dollars in unpaid minimum wages and
overtime compensation was due nearly two hundred thousand em-
ployees. Of this amount sixteen million dollars had not been paid and
in the absence of an employee request the Secretary had no authority
to require payment.42 The paramount reason that more of this money
was not paid was that employers could bring pressure upon em-
ployees who insisted on their statutory rights. 43 The amendment
remedies this by allowing the Secretary to institute the suit without
employee sanction; but if in every such case a time-consuming jury
trial is required it will be impossible to maintain the present number
of such suits. It appears that on the authority of James & Laughli 44
an administrative proceeding could be created to settle the issues of
whether the Act has been violated and if so, to determine how much
money is due to the wronged employees. In that event no jury would
be available to the parties. However, since this claim for back pay
is deemed to be based on a legal issue it is doubtful whether in the
light of Beacon Theatres45 and Dairy Queen6 that Jones & Laughlin
is still good law on this point. Thus it appears that a jury trial is
dictated in the Secretary's suits for back pay under section 17 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act; whether this result is desirable depends on
one's assessment of the value of the jury system.
42. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 141-2 (1961).
43. 107 CoNC. REc. 4505 (1961) (remarks of Representative Roosevelt).
44. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
45. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
46. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
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Labor Law-Representation. Elections-Provision on
Ballot Allowing Vote for "No Representation"
Two contending unions sought certification as the bargaining rep-
resentative for a craft or class of airline employees. The official ballot
provided spaces for the employee to indicate whether he wished to be
represented by one of the two contending unions or by any other
organization or individual. Plaintiff, an association of airline employees
who did not wish to be represented by a union, filed with the National
Mediation Board a petition to intervene in the representation dispute,
asking that a space be provided on the ballot for an employee to state
that he desired no representation.1 The Board dismissed plaintiff's
petition to intervene and refused its request to change the form of the
ballot on the grounds that plaintiff was not a properly constituted
party in interest in the pending dispute. Claiming a right under the
Railway Labor Act2 plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the Board from
holding an election using these ballots. Held, judgment for plaintiff.
Section 2 of the Railway Labor Act requires that the ballots in a rep-
resentation election include a space where eligible voters may express
a preference for no collective bargaining representation. Association
for the Benefit of Non-Contract Employees v. National Mediation
Board, 218 F. Supp. 114 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd per curiam sub nom.
United Airlines v. National Mediation Bd., 49 CCH LAB. L. REP. ff
18,809 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 12, 1964).3
Congress has provided that to settle representation disputes among
railroad and airline employees "the Mediation Board shall be author-
ized to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any
other appropriate method of ascertaining the names of their duly
designated and authorized representatives . . . [and that] in the
conduct of any election for the purposes herein indicated the Board
shall... establish the rules to govern the election .... ."4 However,
the statute does provide that "the majority of any craft or class of
employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the repre-
1. Under the Board's present rules, the Board would consider a write-in ballot for
no representation" as void.
2. Railway Labor Act, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-58
(1958).
3. In another action based on the same disputed election ballot, United Airlines, Inc.
v. National Mediation Bd., Civil No. 402-63 (D.D.C. 1963), which was consolidated
for appeal with the instant case, the district court denied the carrier's motion for a
preliminary injunction, and the court of appeals denied its motion for an injunction
pending appeal. Neither court indicated the grounds for the denial, but one of the
important issues argued in the case was the question of the carrier's standing to enjoin
an election among its employees, an issue not raised in the instant case.
4. 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1958).
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sentative of the craft or class ... ."5 Employees have the "right to
organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing,"6 but they also have "the duty... to exert every reasonable
effort to make and maintain agreements ... and to settle all disputes
[with their employers]." 7 The statute makes no express provision for
judicial review of the Board's decision. The Supreme Court in Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Board,8 indicated that the de-
cisions of the Board are not reviewable. The statute has thus been
characterized as "inexplicitly precluding review."9 A ballot without
a provision for "no representation" has been used by the Board con-
tinuously since its inception in 1934.10 The Board has maintained that
a ballot which gives the employee the right to choose between con-
tending unions but which does not allow him to express a preference
for no representation will best effectuate the intent of Congress in
framing section 2 of the Railway Labor Act. Since the statute im-
poses a duty on the carriers and the employees to negotiate their
disputes through their respective representatives, the Board's position
has been that Congress must have intended that the employees secure
some form of representation; the ballot was drafted so that it could
readily insure the realization of this intent." On the other hand, it
can be observed that one of the stated purposes' 2 of the act and por-
tions of its legislative history13 indicate that Congress intended the
5. 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1958).
6. Ibid.
7. 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, First (1958).
8. 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
9. 4 DAvis, ADInImrRATrvE LAW TREATISE § 28.09 (1958).
10. U.S. NATIONAL MED&TION BD., AD MINSTATION OF THE RAmWAY LABon AcT
1934-1937, at 19 (1958). The ballot has been employed in over 3400 representation
disputes since 1934. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. "The Purposes of the Act are ... (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of
association among employees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise,
of the right of employees to join a labor organization . 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45
U.S.C. § 151(a)2 (1958).
13. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in reporting on
the bill, stated: "It [the Railway Labor Act] provides that employees shall be free
to join any labor union of their choice and likewise be free to refrain from joining any
union if that be their desire and forbids interference by the carriers' officers with the
exercise of said rights." H.R. REP. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934).
During the hearings on this and related bills, Commissioner Joseph P. Eastman,
Federal Coordinator of Transportation and one of the principal draftsmen of the bill,
testified as follows:
"Mr. Huddleston: 'Well, as I get your idea it is the purpose of this bill not to coerce
organizations and not necessarily to imply an organization.'
"Commissioner Eastman: 'No; it does not require collective bargaining on the part
of the employees. If the employees do not wish to organize, prefer to deal individually
with the management with regard to these matters, why, that course is left open to
them, or it should be."' Hearings on H.R. 7650 and 9689 Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1934).
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employees to be free not to associate and to have a right to vote for
no representation. In 1937 the Supreme Court in Virginian Ry. v.
System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees Department14 interpreted
the statutory majority requirement of the Railway Labor Act to mean
that certification of a union did not require a majority of eligible
voters; a majority of those voting in the election would be sufficient.'
5
Although more than a majority of eligible voters participated in the
Virginian election, the court did not base its decision on this distinc-
tion.16 Rather, it was based on the theory that those who did not
vote would be presumed to have assented to the decision of the
majority who did.1 7 Regarding this problem, the National Mediation
Board has had for many years the policy of refusing certification
where less than a majority of eligible voters participated. 8 The At-
torney General advised the President that the NMB had the power
to certify in such a situation but that it could within its discretion
limit its exercise of power to cases in which participation was suff-
ficiently substantial and representative to warrant the presumption
that those who did not vote assented to the will of the majority
voting.19 The courts have upheld this position.20 The ballot form was
first challenged in the courts in 1950, but the Fourth Circuit failed to
reach the merits of the case, holding that exclusive jurisdiction of this
issue was vested in the Mediation Board and that the courts lacked
power to review its action.2' Subsequent to the decision in the instant
case, several suits were instituted challenging this same ballot form.
In two of these cases the courts have asserted jurisdiction and at-
Senator Robert F. Wagner testified before the Senate hearings:
"Senator Wagner: 'I didn't understand these provisions compelled an employee to
join any particular union. I thought the purpose of it was just the opposite, to see
that the men have absolute liberty to join or not to join any union or to remain un-
organized." Hearings on S. 3266 Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1934).
14. 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
15. Id. at 560.
16. But see System Fed'n No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't v. Virginian Ry., 11 F. Supp.
621, 628 (E.D. Va. 1935) (the district court opinion in Virginian). There the court
held that in the election of one craft or class, in which a majority had refrained from
voting, no representative would be certified. This part of the lower court's holding
was not appealed and was, therefore, not before the Supreme Court. 300 U.S. at 559.
17. 300 U.S. at 560.
18. See, e.g., Radio Officers' Union v. National Mediation Bd., 181 F.2d 801 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), where the Board had "indicated its intention to dismiss [the union's]
... application for certification in accordance with a Board policy of many years stand-
ing to decline to certify a representative where less than a majority of the eligible
voters participated by casting valid ballots.' Id. at 801.
19. 40 Ops. A-r'v GEN. 541 (1947).
20. Radio Officers' Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra note 17; System Fed'n
No. 40, Ry. Employees Dep't v. Virginian Ry., supra note 15, at 628.
21. Rose v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 181 F.2d 944 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 851 (1950).
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tempted to reach the merits.22 In two others the courts have declined
to reach the merits, ruling that the Board's decision regarding the
form of the ballot is not reviewable.23 Under a similar statute 4 the
National Labor Relations Board early in its history established the
policy that ballots must contain a place to indicate that the voter
wishes no representation.25 The NLRB reasoned that those not vot-
ing would be presumed to acquiesce in the choice of the majority of
those who did vote, that a blank ballot would be considered a failure
to vote, and that there was no advantage in adopting the rather
ambiguous method of expression involved in casting a blank ballot
or refraining from voting, when the employee's choice could be clearly
indicated by providing a space for it on the ballot.26 As to the related
problem of what percentage of the union need vote to create a valid
election, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has upheld the
principle that in an NLRB election where "no representation" was on
the ballot, a majority of those voting would be sufficient even though
less than a majority of eligible voters participated. 27
The court in the instant case distinguished Switchmen's Union v.
National Mediation Board28 and its progeny,29 noting that courts have
22. In Lynch v. National Mediation Bd., 48 CCH LAB. L. REP. 11 18,467 (D.D.C.
1963), the district court denied the carrier employee's preliminary suit for an injunc-
tion to restrain the Board from certifying a union which had been elected on the basis
that there was no showing of irreparable injury or that plaintiff would ultimately
succeed if the certification were enjoined and a new election were ordered. However,
citing the instant case, the court denied the Board's motion for dismissal or summary
judgment since the court could not agree with the Board's interpretation that the
employees did not have the right to vote for "no representation." The suit was
voluntarily dismissed. Transportation Corp. of America, d/b/a/ Trans Caribbean
Airways, Inc. v. National Mediation Bd., Civil Action 1947-63 (D.D.C. 1963), which
was based on the same disputed election as that in the Lynch case, supra, presented the
issue of standing. The court denied the Board's motion to dismiss, and the carrier now
has under advisement the question of moving for summary judgment.
23. In Droggos v. National Mediation Bd., Civil No. C-63-579 (N.D. Ohio 1963),
the court held that it did not have jurisdiction since the ballot form was within the
discretion of the Board. In Lake Central Airlines v. National Mediation Bd., 63-C-275
(S.D. Ind. 1963), based on the same disputed election as that in the Droggos case,
supra, the court denied the carrier's motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds
that (1) the court had no jurisdiction, (2) the carrier had no standing, and (3) the
action was prematurely brought.
24. National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1958).
25. Interlake Iron Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 55 (1937).
26. Id. at 61-62.
27. NLRB v. Standard Lime & Stone Co., 149 F.2d 435 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 723 (1945).
28. Supra note 8.
29. General Comm. of Adjustment of the Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Missouri-K.-
T.R.R., 320 U.S. 323 (1943); Flight Eng'rs' Ass'n v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 311 F.2d
745 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 924 (1963); NVES Chapter, Flight Eng'rs' Ass'n
v. National Mediation Bd., 314 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Air Line Stewards and
Stewardesses Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 294 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert.
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taken jurisdiction to review actions of the Board where "serious issues
of constitutionality or of statutory construction were presented"3 0
and that the nature of the question presented was such as to urgently
require judicial review in light of section 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act,31 enacted subsequent to the Switchmen's case. Where
judicial review is not precluded by statute or where the agency's dis-
cretion is not exclusive,32 that act enables a court to "decide all rele-
vant questions of law, [and] interpret... statutory provisions" where
necessary to the decisions.33 Turning to the merits of the case, the
court found that the Board's construction of the Railway Labor Act
as forbidding a vote for no representation was not correct; the statute
gives employees "the right to organize and bargain collectively 34
but does not require them to do so.35 This freedom to bargain col-
lectively or to refrain from doing so is emphasized by the provision
that, subject only to the union shop provision, 6 no carrier "shall re-
quire any person seeking employment to sign any contract or agree-
ment promising to join or not to join a labor organization.3 7 The
court recognized that the statute envisions that in most cases em-
ployees will bargain collectively to settle their disputes, but it ruled
that employees should have the opportunity to indicate that no
employer-employee disputes exist and that therefore they neither
need nor want a union to represent them. The court indicated further
that legislative history strongly supported its conclusion and that the
Board's interpretation of the statute was contrary to one of the stated
purposes of the 1934 Railway Labor Act. The court noted that such
an interpretation was inconsistent with the rationale of the Virginian
case, which justified a certification on the basis of majority participa-
tion because "those who do not participate 'are presumed to assent
to the expressed will of the majority of those voting.' . . . ."- How-
ever, the court continued, the Board's interpretation is based on the
theory that those who do not participate are, on the contrary, indicat-
ing their preference for having no representation. The court em-
phasized the importance of freedom of expression of the desires of
denied, 369 U.S. 810 (1962); UNA Chapter, Flight Eng'rs" Ass'n v. National Mediation
Bd., 294 F.2d 905 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 956 (1962); Decker v.
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 258 F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
30. 218 F. Supp. at 124.
31. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958).
32. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1958) (first two lines).
33. 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
34. 48 Stat. 1187 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1958).
35. See statute cited note 12 supra; legislative history cited note 13 supra.
36. 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1958).
37. 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fifth (1958).




the majority in positive terms, so that "the votes recorded for a par-
ticular representative [would] express a free choice rather than a
choice in default of the possibility of expressing disapproval of both
or all proposed representatives." 39  The court concluded that the
statute required that there be on the ballot a space in which em-
ployees could vote for no representation and that an injunction should
issue barring the Board from proceeding with the election unless the
ballots were changed to conform with the court's opinion.
The statutes and legislative history in the instant case seem to indi-
cate that employees have a right not to be represented. The question,
therefore, is not whether the right exists, but to what extent and in
what manner this right will be protected. The right has been given
minimum protection by the NMB's refusal to certify unless at least
half of the employees vote. "No representation" is not placed on the
ballot, but no union is certified if less than fifty-one per cent of the
eligible employees vote. This rule requires fifty per cent of the eligible
voters to defeat certification by not voting; it seems rather anomalous
to force those supporting any position into the position of advocat-
ing not voting. This policy is the least favorable to the "no repre-
resentation" faction of all the alternatives. 40 Furthermore, it does not
give an accurate report of the employees' wishes, since it places in the
same group those who refuse to vote because they did not want union
representation and those who did not vote simply because they were
apathetic or unable to do so. This method places a great burden on
the leaders of the "no representation" faction to inform its supporters
of the proper action to follow to defeat certification. However, if
fifty out of a craft or class of one hundred refuse to vote, no
union will be certified. Implicit in the court's ruling in the instant
case is the assertion that this is inadequate protection of the em-
ployees' right, and, in an effort to hurdle the jurisdictional problem
and avoid the problem of non-reviewability of matters of admin-
istrative discretion, the court concludes that the statute requires
that "no representation" be on the ballot.4' While the statute does
require that the "majority" shall determine who shall be the rep-
resentative, and this may be extended to "if there shall be a repre-
sentative," it nowhere requires that this determination be made in any
specific manner. In fact, the statute expressly entrusts this determina-
tion to the discretion of the Board and expresses no limitation on the
Board's discretion. By its decision, the district court has in effect
substituted its discretion for that of the Board.42 In addition to the
39. Interlake Iron Corp., 4 N.L.R.B. 55, 61 (1937).
40. See material discussed note 41 infra.
41. 218 F. Supp. at 130.
42. The court did not set out the rules for handling a run-off election; these rules
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rule which has been used by the NMB, various rules have been used
or suggested by the NLRB, each of which would give "no representa-
tion" a greater or lesser chance of winning the election.43 Both boards
would presumably be formulated by the Board. Even under the least favorable run-off
procedure, plaintiff will be in a better position than it was formerly since its adherents
will not inadvertantly vote for a union, assuming that there is a choice only between
the two unions.
43. All of the rules of the NLRB have permitted a space for "no representation."
They may be listed as follows:
(a) If no choice receives a majority of votes cast on the first ballot, a run-off
election is held between the union with the most votes and "no representation." See,
e.g., Coos Bay Lumber Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 476 (1939). Under this rule "no representa-
tion" need not receive any votes on the first ballot to be placed on the run-off. The
rule is based on the idea that this is not a political election, where someone must
be elected; the statute does not require a union to be certified, and no one should
be forced into voting for a union (which would be the effect of having two unions
on the run-off ballot). This method gives great weight to the effect of inter-union
rivalry by assuming that, in the event that the less successful union has no chance
of winning fifty-one per cent in the run-off, those who had supported that union would
prefer to have no representation than to be represented by the opposing union. While
this may be true, the use of this rule overlooks the basic concept that both union A
and union B represent a policy of collective bargaining, which Congress intended to
favor. Not only does this rule not favor collective bargaining, but it places a decided
disadvantage on it.
(b) If no choice receives a majority of votes cast on the first ballot and the total
votes for the two unions comprise a substantial majority, a run-off is held between the
two contending unions. Otherwise, the run-off is held between "no representation" and
the union with the most votes. See, e.g., R.K. LeBlonde Machine Tool Co., 22
N.L.R.B. 465 (1940). This rule would permit "no representation" on the run-off ballot
if neither union received a majority and if the total union vote was less than a "sub-
stantial majority." It would eliminate the apparent gross inequity of invalidating one
choice (one of the unions), which received forty-eight per cent and validating another
choice ("no represenation"), which received three per cent.
(c) If no choice receives a majority of the votes cast on the first ballot, a run-off is
held between the two top choices. See, e.g., Golten Marine Co. v. Douds, 137 F.
Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1958).
This rule, which is presently being used by the NLRB, would permit "no representa-
tion" on the run-off ballot if it received a minimum of twenty-six per cent of the
votes, and neither union received a majority. It assumes that "no representation" is
the equivalent of representation by the individual and that, since it is opposed by
representation by union A and representation by union B, all three are choices of like
kind and should be afforded like treatment. This assumption-that there is no difference
in kind between "no representation," union A, and union B-gives the election the
appearance of being the most democractic since it does not ostensibly favor any party.
In reality, it favors "no representation" by forcing those who desire unionization to
split their votes between the two union choices, each of which must compete in-
dividually with the "no representation" faction. This means that although seventy-five
per cent of the voters may want some form of union representation, the run-off ballot
might list only the top union and "no representation."
(d) If no choice receives a majority of votes cast on the first ballot and if each
union receives at least twenty per cent of the vote, a run-off is held between the two
contending unions. Otherwise the run-off is held between the union with the most
votes and "no representation." See, e.g., B.F. Coodrich Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1250 (1947);
11 Fed. Reg. 613 (1946). This rule would permit "no representation" on the run-off
ballot if it received a minimum of thirty-one per cent of the votes and neither union
received a majority. It would eliminate the apparent gross inequity of invalidating one
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have been given the power to regulate elections, and both seem to
have used this power at various times to aid or hinder unionization or
"no representation," depending on the orientation of the boards as to
the realities of union elections and, in general, as to the desirability of
having union representation. The election procedure of the NMB, as
well as those procedures used by the NLRB, seems to be a valid
exercise of discretion which ought not be overruled by the courts
unless it conflicts with express provisions in the statute. The court
in the instant case uses the rationale of the Virginian decision in an
attempt to show that the majority requirement in the statute has, in
fact, been violated. This rationale, however, is not applicable, for the
conflict here presented is intrinsically different from the one before the
Virginian court. In that case there was no real contest as to whether
there would or would not be union representation; the rationale is
not applicable in a situation such as this, where there is, in addition
to the contest between contending unions, an implicit contest to
decide whether there shall be union representation. The Virginian
decision concerned an election in which a relatively small percentage
of the employees did not vote; it could be fairly assumed that, because
of their small number and because one of the contending unions was
sponsored by the employer, these uncast votes represented voters who
were unable to vote or were uninterested in the outcome and could
in fact be presumed to assent to the will of the majority. On the other
hand, if a case arose in which the percentage of non-voters was greater
choice ("no representation"), which received forty-nine per cent of the votes and
validating another choice (one of the unions), which received three per cent of the
votes.
(e) If no choice receives a majority of votes cast on the first ballot, a run-off is
held between the two contending unions; "no representation" is never permitted on the
run-off ballot. See, e.g., R.K. LeBlonde Machine Tool Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 465, 469
(1940) (concurring opinion, (dictum)). This rule would require fifty-one per cent of
the votes cast on the first ballot to defeat certification. The rule seems to place the
problem in its proper perspective. It permits those wishing no representation to express
themselves in positive terms, while recognizing that "no representation" is the anti-
thesis of unionization. The first ballot determines if the majority of the craft or class
wants unionization or "no representation"; if the latter, the problem is solved, if the
former, a run-off is held to decide which union will be the representative. This rule
assumes that those who voted for the number two union in the first election would
rather be represented by the number one union than have no representation at all
(which would be possible if the run-off were held between the number one union and
"no representation"). In fact, considering the intense inter-union rivalry engendered
by election disputes, this assumption is probably not true. The rule seems to disfavor
"no representation," for, even if it received forty-nine per cent of the votes cast and the
unions received forty-eight per cent and three per cent respectively, "no representation"
would be invalidated in the run-off. However, considering the fact that "no represen-
tation" constitutes a choice which is essentially opposed to unionization, it seems just
that it should be pitted against the combined forces of those choices which represent
unionization. From this standpoint, the rule neither favors nor disfavors "no represen-
tation."
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and in which there was no company-sponsored union, a more
reasonable assumption would be that there was a contestant ("no
representation") being evidenced by non-voting. Since it is not
reasonable to assume that these uncast votes represented voters un-
able to vote or uninterested in the outcome, the presumption that
those not voting assent to the will of the majority should not be
applied. However, language in the Virginian decision seems to indi-
cate that if forty-nine per cent of the eligible voters do not vote, they
are presumed to assent to the will of the majority.44 Such a distinction
is unrealistic. The Virginian case concerned an election in which no
real contestant was evidenced by non-voting, and its'rationale should
be limited to such cases. It is submitted that the most equitable pro-
cedure permits "no representation" on the ballot, and if none receives
a majority of votes cast, a run-off election will be held between the
contending unions.45 The NMB's procedure, while it appears less
equitable, is not invalid; it merely reflects the Board's interpretation
of the realities of union elections and its emphasis on the desirability
of having union representation. It is submitted that the agency set
up by Congress to deal with these specific problems is peculiarly able
to deal with them and should be permitted to exercise its broad dis-
cretion to determine what these realities of union elections demand
and precisely to what degree the various parties should be favored.
Certainly the Board's position would be more acceptable if it would
provide adequate publicity of its policy to the affected employees;
however, it seems unwilling to do this.46 This deficiency should not
be fatal although it does seem reasonable to require that the Board
formalize its policy by promulgating a rule in the Federal Register
stating that certification will be refused if less than a majority of
eligible employees vote. Although the ballot used by the NMB is
ambiguous in its method and is extreme in its discouragement of "no
representation," it still provides a means by which a majority of
employees may express their desire for no representation, and this is
all that is required by the statute. It seems to follow that the ballot
was within the allowable area of discretion provided by the statute.
44. 300 U.S. at 560.
45. See note 43(e) supra.
46. See 218 F. Supp. at 125.
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Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practice-Availability of
Injunction Prior to Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
Plaintiff employers' association brought suit to enjoin the Regional
Director of the NLRB and others from proceeding against it and its
members' in a trial de novo of a consolidated unfair labor practice
case 2 pending before the Board.3 Five months after the original
hearings had begun, the trial examiner had himself disqualified,
principally because of the objectionable conduct of union counsel.
The NLRB, here pressing the rights of the union, designated a new
trial examiner to begin the hearings de novo.4 Plaintiff contended that
the expense of duplicating the lengthy hearings would cause it ir-
reparable injury.5 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the injunctive relief sought was not within the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the district court because the plaintiff had failed
1. The plaintiffs also asked for an order directing the Board's Chief Trial Examiner
to reinstate the original trial examiner. Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden, 215
F. Supp. 828, 829 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
2. The Regional Director of the NLRB issued separate complaints against five
employers after investigation of unfair labor practice charges filed by two unions
recently certified as bargaining agents for employees of these five employers. After
further investigation "the Regional Director issued a complaint against the association.
The complaint alleged that the association was committing unfair labor practices by
assisting and inducing some of its members (namely, the five employers against whom
complaints had already issued) to refuse to bargain with the charging unions." Ibid.
These cases were then consolidated.
3. "By delegation, through the Taft-Hartley Act, the National Labor Relations Board
has been granted complete authority over representation and complaint matters, insofar
as they are 'in' or 'affect' interstate commerce, without any qualification except that
the legislative purposes be effectuated." Fonxoscir, LABOR LAW 649-50 (1953).
(Footnotes omitted.) See Volney Felt Mills, Inc. v. Le Bus, 196 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.
1952); American Optical Co. v. Andert, 108 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1952).
4. "On July 30, 1962, hearing on the consolidated cases opened before Trial
Examiner Reyman in Chicago . . . . On December 12, 1962, when the consolidated
proceeding had accumulated about 1,800 pages of transcript and 100 exhibits, Trial
Examiner Reyman adjourned the hearing sine die." Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v.
Madden, supra note 1, at 829. Reyman bad himself disqualified for "reasons con-
cerning his personal health." Id. at 830. However Judge Campbell determined that
"any sickness due to tension Trial Examiner Reyman may now have was caused by
what he felt to be the contemptuous and obstreperous conduct of attorney Gore." Id.
at 831. Since the Board was advocating the alleged rights of the union Mr. Gore was
representing, Judge Campbell observed that "the board's action here ... was occasioned
not so much by its solicitude for the trial examiner's health as by its fear of his
unfavorable decision were he permitted to resume the case." Ibid. Subsequent to this
action Reyman has been assigned to and conducted other Board hearings; according to
the evidence Reyman was available at the time of trial. Ibid.
5. Plaintiff argues that unless this court intervenes he will have to spend time and
money in defending against the same charges. Ibid. Plaintiff lacks an administrative
remedy because "review of Board action in certain labor practice cases applies only
to its final orders." Id. at 832.
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to exhaust its administrative remedies.6 Held, injunction granted.
Where irreparable injury will result if plaintiff is required to exhaust its
administrative remedies a federal district court can exercise equitable
jurisdiction in an unfair labor practice action under section 10 of the
National Labor Relations Act. Automobile Trade Association v.
Madden, 215 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
Section 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act 7 makes specific
provision for review of section 10 unfair labor practice charges by
the courts of appeals. There is no corresponding provision for review
in a section 98 certification and representation action, 9 except with
reference to section 9(d) where the certification proceeding is pre-
liminary to the unfair labor practice action.' 0 The nonstatutory review
of certification orders is usually" sought through the general equity
6. This argument is properly classified as one of "exhaustion" rather than "primary
jurisdiction." While both doctrines must be considered in this area, exhaustion applies
"where a claim is cognizable in the first instance by an administrative agency alone."
United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63 (1956). Since the federal courts
and the NLRB cannot in theory have concurrent jurisdiction over a controversy in-
volving unfair labor practices, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is inapplicable.
See 3 DAvis, ArmnmTs IRA=w LAw 1-115 (1959).
7. 61 Stat. 147, 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), (f) (1958).
8. 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958).
9. "The conclusion is unavoidable that Congress, as the result of a deliberate choice
of conflicting policies, has excluded representation certifications of the Board from the
review by federal appellate courts authorized by the Wagner Act except in the cir-
cumstances specified in § 9(d)." AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940). "A
majority of the court believes that Congress has dealt in section 9(d) with reviews of
certification and 'decertification,' and has provided therein the only relief it means to
grant on that subject." Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F.2d 714, 716 (2d Cir. 1948).
Support for this view may be found in the legislative history of the original National
Labor Relations Act. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935); H. R. REP.
No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935); 79 CONG. REc. 7658 (1935). See also Local
1545, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, 286 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1960); Elm City
Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 123 F. Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1954); White v. Herzog,
80 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1948).
10. "[The Act] does, however, provide an indirect review in section 9(d) which
directs that when an order under section 10(c) prohibiting an unfair labor practice
has been based in part on a certification following an investigation pursuant to section
9(c) and is to be enforced or reviewed under section 10(c) or 10(f) the record of
the certification and investigation shall be included in the transcript." Fitzgerald v.
Douds, supra note 9, at 716. See also AFL v. NLRB, supra note 9.
11. Some attempts have been made to gain jurisdiction under provisions of the
Federal Administrative Procedure Act. The pertinent section reads in part as follows:
"Except so far as (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2) agency action is by law
committed to agency discretion-(a) Any person suffering legal wrong . . . shall be
entitled to judicial review thereof." 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1958).
While this question has not been decided by the Supreme Court, the rule has been
generally followed that the Administrative Procedure Act does not confer jurisdiction
on the district courts to review representation proceedings of the Board. See, e.g.,
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Leedom, 174 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1959); Elm
City Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 9; White v. Douds, 80 F. Supp. 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1948); White v. Herzog, supra note 9.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction 2 of the district court. Although attempts to get review
have generally been unsuccessful, 3 exceptions have been recognized.
These exceptions14 may be categorized as: (1) where the Board's
action has resulted in the denial of a constitutional right; 5 (2) where
the Board's action clearly violates a "specific ...and mandatory"'6
provision of the act; 17 and (3) where the action of the Board exceeds
12. The general jurisdiction of the district courts is relied upon to justify judicial
review where no provision for review is contained in the specific statutory scheme.
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1959). See Switch-
men's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (arising under 28
U.S.C. § 41); Madden v. Brotherhood of Transit Employees, 147 F.2d 439 (4th Cir.
1945) (arising under general equity power); Reilly v. Millis, 144 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 879 (1945) (injunctive relief sought under general equity
powers). But see Millis v. Inland Empire Dist. Council, 325 U.S. 697 (1945), reversing
144 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (injunctive relief sought, but denied, under general
equity powers).
13. Inland Empire Dist. Council v. Millis, supra note 12; Switchmens Union v.
National Mediation Bd., supra note 12; AFL v. NLRB, supra note 9; Reilly v. Millis,
supra note 12; Reeves v. Phillips, 206 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Sheridan Silver
Co. v. Alpert, 197 F. Supp. 228 (D. Mass. 1959).
14. Robinson v. McLeod, 213 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. McLeod, 202 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd, 302 F.2d 354 (2d Cir.
1962). In each case the court recognized and categorized the exceptions that allowed
jurisdiction by the district court. In neither case was one of these exceptions present.
15. This exception originated in Fitzgerald v. Douds, supra note 9, and Fay v.
Douds, 172 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1948). The court held that "if this assertion of a
constitutional right is not transparently frivolous, it gave the district court jurisdiction;
and having once acquired jurisdiction, the court might, and should, dispose of all
other questions which arose, even though they would not be independently justiciable."
Fay v. Douds, supra at 723. However a proper constitutional question was not pre-
sented in either case. Although this exception has been recognized in a number of
cases, jurisdiction by the district court has been granted very rarely. Eastern Greyhound
Lines v. Fusco, 323 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1963); Local 25, Teamsters Union v. Greene,
196 F. Supp. 772 (D. Mass. 1961); Mechanics Educ. Soc'y v. Schaufler, 103 F. Supp.
130 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Volney Felt Mills v. LeBus, supra note 3; White v. Douds, supra
note 11; White v. Herzog, supra note 9. The court found the required constitutional
violation in Elm City Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 9, but failed to grant
jurisdiction saying "the plaintiff ... [argues] that if a constitutional issue is raised,
ipso facto, the jurisdiction of the district court immediately takes hold. But this is not
so. There must also be the necessity for equitable relief." Id. at 840. See Worthing-
ton Pump & Mach. Corp. v. Douds, 97 F. Supp. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (district
court assumed jurisdiction on the basis of constitutional question but refused to give
relief because of failure to show irreparable injury).
16. Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 188 (1958).
17. The Supreme Court intimated in two early decisions, AFL v. NLRB, supra note
9, and Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., supra note 12, that resort might
be had to the equity jurisdiction of the district courts where action by the Board was in
violation of a statutory or constitutional right. Following the AFL decision, equitablo
jurisdiction in representation matters was asserted by a number of lower courts but
relief was rarely granted. De Pratter v. Farmer, 232 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(district court is without jurisdiction to review a representation proceeding because
there was no showing of unlawful activity on the part of the board); Klein v.
Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (district court asserted jurisdiction but
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its jurisdiction in the field of foreign affairs.' 8 The nonstatutory review
of unfair labor practice actions, on the other hand, depends on whether
statutory review by the court of appeals may be circumvented.' 9 If
the court adheres to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
did not give injunction because Board did not violate section 9(c) of the NLRA).
Eighteen years later a case presented squarely the situation found not to have been
presented in AFL v. NLRB. This situation resulted where the unlawful action of the
Board inflicted an injury on the plaintiff. Mr. Justice Whittaker said in Leedom v.
Kyne, supra note 16, that "this was an attempted exercise at power that bad been
specifically withheld. It deprived the professional employees of a right assured to
them by Congress. Surely, in these circumstances, a Federal District Court has
jurisdiction of an original suit to prevent deprivation of a right so given." Id. at 189.
For examinations of the significance of Leedom v. Kyne, see 27 GEO. WAsH. L. REv.
600 (1959); 42 MnN. L. REv. 938 (1958); 11 STAN. L. REv. 760 (1959); 33 TUL. L.
REV. 705 (1959); 1959 U. ILL. L.F. 682; 5 UTAH L. REv. 561 (1957); 12 VA_,. L.
Rwv. 1404 (1959). See also 8 BUFFALO L. REv. 72 (1959); 76 HARv. L. REv. 401, 403
(1962). As many courts have pointed out, "since Leedom v. Kyne, the Court of Ap-
peals ...has resisted every effort to apply that decision to orders in § 9(c) proceed-
ings, alleged to violate statutory or constitutional commands ...." Local 1545, United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. Vincent, supra note 9, at 132. For comments on this case see
29 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 948 (1961). The courts have consistently found no violation
of "clear and mandatory" statutory language. Boyles Galvanizing Co. v. Waers, 291 F.2d
791 (10th Cir. 1961) (district court cannot take jurisdiction because calling of election
was not beyond the statutory power and authority of the union); McLeod v. Local
746, United Bhd. of Indus. Workers, 288 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1961) (unreasonable
action by the Board short of violation of an act is inadequate to establish jurisdiction
by the district court); International Ass'n of Tool Craftsmen v. Leedom, 276 F.2d 514
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960) (no showing that the Board violated
a "clear and mandatory" statutory prohibition by according controlling consideration
to bargaining history); Leedom v. Local 494, Norwich Printing Specialties Union, 275
F.2d 628 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 969 (1960) (Board did not violate §
9(b) (2), thus the district court was without jurisdiction and erred in enjoining the
election); National Biscuit Div. v. Leedom, 265 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1011 (1959) (court does not find action by the Board that exceeds its
authority); Lawrence Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 222 F. Supp. 154 (D.D.C.
1963) (Board did not violate § 9(c) and so district court does not have jurisdiction);
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Leedom, 174 F. Supp. 171 (D.D.C. 1959) (not a
question of an unlawful action on the part of the Board of the type which would
confer jurisdiction on the district court). But see Local 46, Miami Newspaper Printing
Pressman's Union v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (failure of the Board
to certify the results of an election was a violation of § 9(c)(1)); Boire v. Greyhound
Corp., 309 F.2d 397 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 964 (1962) (Board violates §
9 of the NLRA by including in the representation election employees of an independent
contractor).
18. In the only case since Leedom v. Kyne where the Supreme Court felt the facts
sustained district court jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Clark said, "While here the Board has
violated no specific prohibition in the Act, the overriding consideration is that the Board's
assertion of power to determine the representation of foreign seamen aboard vessels
under foreign flags has aroused vigorous protests from foreign governments and
created international problems for our Government." McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional,
372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963).
19. Only in rare cases has nonstatutory review of unfair labor practice actions been
allowed. One recent case where this was allowed is Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston,
295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). There the injunction was predicated upon findings that
a second remand order in an unfair labor practice case was in violation of the Board's
duty to dispose of the case with reasonable dispatch and was arbitrary and oppressive.
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remedies,20 nonstatutory review is precluded.21 However, where the
exhaustion of the administrative remedy is not required2 because of
the likelihood of irreparable injury, 3 lack of an adequate administra-
tive remedy,24 presence of a constitutional question,2 5 or lack of juris-
diction of the action by the agency,2 the district court is permitted
to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.
In the instant case the court recognized that generally plaintiffs in
an unfair labor practice action must exhaust their administrative
remedies prior to invoking the jurisdiction of the district court
7.2
However, the court acknowledged that there were exceptions28 to the
exhaustion rule and stated three criteria 9 that must be met to prevent
20. There has been some confusion as to the application to specific cases of the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Justice Magruder says "this doctrine
had its origin in a discretionary rule adopted by courts of equity to the effect that
a petitioner will be denied equitable relief when he has failed to pursue an available
administrative remedy by which he might obtain the same relief." Smith v. United
States, 199 F.2d 377, 381 (1st Cir. 1952). For a thorough analysis of this doctrine,
see Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938); 3 DAvis, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 50-51; Berger, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 48 YAU L.f. 981
(1939); Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12 BusFFA, o L. REv. 327
(1963); 2 RAcE. REL. L. REP. 561 (1957).
21. Franklin v. Jonco Aircraft Corp., 346 U.S. 868 (1953) ("appellee having failed
to exhaust its administrative remedy, the judgment is reversed"); Vapor Blast Mfg.
Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1960) (dismissed for lack of juris-
diction on the ground that review provision of the NLBA provided for adequate review
of the issue in § 10(b), (e), (f)); Biazevich v. Becker, 161 F. Supp. 261 (S.D. Cal.
1958) (district court refused to require Board officers and agents to produce before a
Board trial examiner certain documents pursuant to the terms of subpoenas issued by
the trial examiner during an unfair labor practice hearing).
22. See Note, Primary jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 16
Wyo. L.J. 290 (1962).
23. The normal expenses of continued litigation before the administrative agency
have been held legally insufficient to constitute irreparable injury. Allen v. Grand Cen.
Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 540 (1950); Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209, 220 (1938); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., supra
note 20. But of. Public Util. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943).
24. Where the administrative remedy, though available, is unreasonably delayed,
the doctrine of exhaustion is relaxed. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276
U.S. 499 (1928); Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926). See also Frozen
Food Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v.
United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918).
25. "If... an administrative proceeding might leave no remnant of the constitutional
question, the administrative remedy plainly should be pursued. But where the only
question is whether it is constitutional to fasten the administrative procedure onto the
litigant, the administrative agency may be defied and judicial relief sought as the only
effective way of protecting the asserted constitutional right." Public Util. Comm'n v.
United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958). See also Lichter v. United States, 334
U.S. 742 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
26. Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., supra note 23; Aircraft & Diesel Equip.
Corp. v. Hirsch, supra note 25; Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540
(1946); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United States, 249 U.S. 557 (1919).
27. Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden, supra note 1, at 830.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 831.
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its application: (1) The actions of the Board must be in excess of
its authority. (2) The result of the Board's conduct must be irrepara-
ble injury to the plaintiff. (3) The plaintiff must otherwise lack an
adequate administrative or judicial remedy.
Failure of the courts to recognize different30 requirements for
judicial review under sections 9 and 10 of the NLRA has resulted in
an anomaly. Cases are cited interchangeably regardless of the section
that governs the particular case. In the instant case, an unfair labor
practice action, the court cites a certification case as precedent for
its holding.31 There are distinctions between the requirements for
review under each section which makes this intermingling of prece-
dent unjustifiable. In order to obtain review of a certification action,
plaintiff must show a violation of a "clear and mandatory" statutory
direction. 32 In an unfair labor practice case he must show "actions
of the Board in excess of its authority."3 3 Although some type of
injury to the plaintiff is required under either section, a technical
injury34 will suffice in a certification action, while plaintiff in an
unfair labor case must be subjected to real and substantial injury.35
The inadequacy of the administrative remedy is not particularly
important in the certification cases but is a strict requirement in the
unfair labor practice cases.36 These differences have resulted from
the failure of Congress to provide for statutory review of certification
like that in the court of appeals for unfair labor practice cases. The
absence of statutory review over the certification action is based on
a policy of securing a final result in a certification election as rapidly
as possible.37 That the same policy consideration does not apply in
30. There are also definite similarities in the requirements for judicial review of a
certification order and of an unfair labor practice ruling by a district court. Both
(theories) allow review where a valid constitutional question is involved. Irreparable
injury to the plaintiff must be alleged when proceeding under either section. These
similarities exist, first, because equitable jurisdiction must be asserted under both sec-
tions for review by the district court and, second, because the case law in this
field evolved from a hybrid case, AFL v. NLRB, supra note 9, that involved an unfair
labor practice ruling based on failure to bargain because of an allegedly unjust certifica-
tion order.
31. In the instant case the court cites Leedom v. Kyne, supra note 16, a case which
was brought under § 9 of the NLRA.
32. See note 16 supra.
33. Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden, supra note 1, at 831.
34. See note 16 supra.
35. Chicago Auto. Trade Ass'n v. Madden, supra note 1, at 831-32.
36. Id. at 832.
37. In reference to the procedure for review of certification actions under section 9,
a House Committee declared: "The weakness of this procedure is that under the
provision for review of election orders employers have a means of holding up the
election for months by an application to the circuit court of appeals .... At the present
time 10 cases for review of the Board's election orders are pending in the circuit
courts of appeals. Only three have been argued and none have been decided." H.R.
REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1935).
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unfair labor cases is indicated by the congressional provision for
appellate review of these decisions. In recognition of this congres-
sional policy the courts have imposed much stricter requirements on
nonstatutory review of certification actions. Recognition of these
basic differences in nonstatutory review under sections 9 and 10 of
the NLRA will insure the facilitation of the different congressional
policies in certification and unfair labor practice cases.
Taxation-Federal Estate Tax-
Survivor's Annuity as Insurance Under Section 2039 (a)
Thomas C. McCobb, a retired employee of Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, was, prior to his demise, an annuitant under a company-
funded annuity plan. His widow received benefit payments under a
death benefit plan, the cost of which was unfunded and was borne en-
tirely by the company. The death benefit plan provided for monthly
payments to surviving dependents for one year in the same amount
that would have been received by McCobb under the annuity plan, less
Social Security payments made. The annuitant had no right to desig-
nate beneficiaries other than those specified in the plan, except the
negative right, subject to the approval of the company, to exclude
them on written request. Standard Oil could have cancelled the
death benefit plan at its option, but, since it did not, the rights of
McCobb's widow became fixed at McCobb's death; the widow was
then entitled to receive over thirty thousand dollars under the
plan. The estate paid an estate tax deficiency based on the Commis-
sioner's inclusion of these payments in the gross estate. Upon denial of
a refund, suit was brought in federal district court, where it was held
that the death benefit payments were not includible in the decedent's
gross estate. On appeal, held, reversed. An unfunded plan, involving no
actuarial distribution of the risk of premature death, whereby the em-
ployer agreed to pay a sum certain to a named beneficiary upon the
death of a retired employee, does not shift the risk and distribute the
risk of death, and thus is not insurance within section 2039(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954; therefore the benefits payable under
the plan are taxable to the decedents gross estate as an "annuity or
other payment."1 All v. McCobb, 321 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1963).
1. "The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or other payment receivable
by any beneficiary by reason of surviving the decedent under any form of contract or
agreement entered into after March 3, 1931 (other than as insurance under policies
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Section 2039 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 requires that
survivors' payments under an "annuity or other payment" be included
in the decedents gross estate if they were payable under a "contract
or agreement" or if the decedent "possessed the right" to receive pay-
ments; however, life insurance is specifically excluded from taxation
under this section. Bahen's Estate v. United States2 upheld Treasury
Regulation 20.2039-1(b), 3 which includes an informal arrangement
or understanding within the phrase "contract or agreement" and en-
compasses within that phrase more than a formal contract between
the employer and the employee. Bahen also commented on the
requirement that the decedent must have "possessed the right" to
receive payments. Insurance policies are included within the gross
estate by section 2042(2) when the decedent possesses any of the
incidents of ownership at his death, but this requirement refers to an
actual property interest rather than the existence of a possibility that
some time in the future the decedent might possess an enforceable
claim to the payments (as was the case in Bahen).4 Although the
survivor's rights under such a plan or plans would not be fixed until
the decedents death, a sufficient possibility of possessing the property
right would exist if the payments had customarily been made.5 A life
annuity plan established by the decedent's employer has the function
of protecting against the risk of extreme longevity, while insurance has
the opposite function of protecting against the risk of premature
on the life of the decedent), if, under such contract or agreement, an annuity or other
payment was payable to the decedent, or the decedent possessed the right to receive
such annuity or payment, either alone or in conjunction with another for life or for
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which
does not in fact end before his death." INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(a).
2. 305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962), 16 VAry. L. REv. 989 (1963).
3. "The term 'contract or agreement' includes any arrangement, understanding or
plan, or any combination of arrangements, understandings or plans arising by reason
of the decedents employment." Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(ii) (1963).
4. Estate of Edward H. Wadewitz v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. No. 97 (1963). The
decedents right to receive future payments was forfeitable only at his own election,
and by choosing to refrain from causing any of the voiding contingencies to happen
he preserved his rights. But see 67 YALE L.J. 467, 475 (1958), where it is suggested
that equating possibility with right overreaches the statutory language. "Possessed the
right" is given detailed analysis in 16 VAND. L. REV. 989, 992 (1963).
5. "If, however, it can be established that the employer has consistently paid an
annuity under such bircumstances, the annuity will be considered as having been
paid under a 'contract or agreement'." Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b) (2), Example (4) (a)
(1963). In the legislative history of section 2039 periodic payments for a specified period
of time are included within the annuity, and the situation where the survivor of an
annuitant continued to receive payments made by the decedents employer is given as
an example of receiving an annuity or other payment. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess. 123, 469-72 (1954). But see Worthen v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727
(D. Mass. 1961) (yearly bonus reasonably expected, because of past practice, but held,
no right to receive until actually voted by the corporation).
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death. 6 A common type of annuity pays the annuitant a fixed sum
for life and after his death the amount of the annuitant's payment
remaining with the company is paid to a named beneficiary. The
primary concern of this arrangement is to insure the annuitant against
the risk of extreme longevity. In addition it provides assurance that
the annuitant or his estate will receive the face amount of the policy.
Therefore, when the decedent's employer establishes a life annuity
plan and establishes and maintains a plan to pay periodic benefits
to a beneficiary, the value of the beneficiary's annuity is includible
in the decedents gross estate.7 The payments are excluded from the
gross estate if they qualify as insurance under section 2039(a), but
the Treasury Regulations fail to set out the attributes of insurance.8
Whether or not payments to a decedents survivor under an "un-
qualified plan"9 fall within the parenthetical exclusion of insurance in
section 2039(a)'0 depends on the definition given by the courts to
the term "insurance." In Helvering v. Le Gierse, the Supreme Court
held that a contract must shift and distribute the risk of premature
death if it is to qualify as insurance;1 the Court found the risk ele-
ment was not present because the insured had purchased both an
annuity and a life insurance policy from a commercial insurer for a
single premium that exceeded the possible proceeds from the in-
surance policy.12 When the reserve value of a life insurance policy
becomes greater than the proceeds payable at death, a risk element
is no longer present, but when there is no funding, a policy has
no reserve value.13 Although the nature of the payment is usually
6. "The risk assumed in an annuity contract is to pay to the annuitant an annuity so
long as he lives, while the risk assumed in a life insurance contract is to pay upon in-
sured's death." Rosenbloom v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 F. Supp. 692, 695 (W.D.
Mo. 1946), remanded on other grounds, 163 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1947). See also Knight v.
Finnegan, 74 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. Mo. 1947); Corporation Comm'n v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc'y, 73 Ariz. 171, 239 P.2d 360 (1951); Cruthers v. Neeld, 14 N.J. 497, 103
A.2d 153 (1954).
7. "All rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to others by reason of the
employment... are considered together in determining whether or not section 2039(a)
. . . applies. The scope of section 2039(a) . . . cannot be limited by indirection."
Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-1(b)(2), Example (6) (1963).
8. Treas. Reg. § 20.2042-1(a) (1963) merely states that insurance refers to all life
insurance.
9. Not qualified under INT. REv. CoDE oF 1954, § 401. When an annuity or other
payment is receivable under certain qualified plans, section 2039(c) excludes the pay-
ment from the decedents gross estate. Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(a) (1963).
10. See note I supra.
11. The individual aspect of insurance is characterized by risk shifting, while risk
distribution is the method of spreading the cost of a potential loss throughout a group.
See 59 YALE L.J. 780 (1950).
12. 312 U.S. 531, 539 (1941). See also Essenfeld v. Commissioner, 311 F.2d 208, 209
(2d Cir. 1962).
13. For a general discussion of problems in this area see LowND.s & KwRAm,
FDmAL EsrA AND Gxrr TAXEs 215 n.42 (1962).
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ascertained by a comparison of the reserve value of the policy with
the value of the death benefits payable at the decedent's death, an
inability to prove an exact amount as reserve value does not preclude
a payments being treated as insurance, so long as there is a shifting
and distribution of the risk of premature death.14 When the Com-
missioner in Haynes v. United States5 argued that a health insurance
plan established by a self-insuring employer should not be treated as
insurance for income tax purposes because there was no payment of
fixed periodic premiums and no creation of a fund to assure payments
of the disability benefits, the Supreme Court held that these were not
necessary elements of insurance. When these cases are considered
together, it is clear that shifting the risk of premature death to another
and distributing that risk, whereby the cost of a loss is diffused
throughout a group, is the essence of insurance for this purpose; fund-
ing, premium paying, and actuarial planning are common attributes of
insurance but they are not essential.
The court in the instant case considered the annuity plan and the
death benefit plan as a single integrated plan under section 2039,16
accepting Treasury Regulation 20.2039-1(b) (i)1'7 as descriptive
of the relationship. Therefore the payments made to the widow
could be excluded from the gross estate under section 2039(a) only
if they were denominated insurance. Rejecting the lower court's find-
ing that the payments received by Mrs. McCobb were functionally
insurance since they were designed to provide partial protection
against the loss of her husband's retirement allowance through his
untimely death,18 the court pointed out that providing partial pro-
tection was a characteristic of a great many survivorship annuities,
which are not insurance for purposes of federal estate taxation. The
court noted both a lack of funding and premium payments and stated
that there was no risk shifting or risk distribution in the death benefit
14. Commissioner v. Treganowan, 183 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 853 (1950).
15. 353 U.S. 81 (1957). A recent letter ruling of the Attorney General of Delaware
emphasized that the Haynes interpretation of the term "accident and health insurance"
is not conclusive of the question of the meaning of that term as used in the Delaware
income tax statute; he also stated that the interpretation in Haynes was too broad.
He ruled that the term insurance will be given its "commonly understood" meaning,
"a binding insurance contract, with payment of premiums determined by actuarial com-
putations, and coverage based upon such premiums," although noninsured plans are
specifically recognized as being included within the term "accident and health in-
surance" under section 105(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 19 J. TAXAION
379 (1963).
16. See note 6 supra.
17. See note 1 supra.




plan. The court went on to say that the company did not accept the
risk of decedent's premature death by gambling with the decedent
that he would live a long life and pay for the plan before his death.
Furthermore, the court continued, the company did not distribute this
risk over a large group of persons based on actuarial data. "The
company did nothing more than promise to pay a sum certain to a
named beneficiary upon the death of a retired employee."19
The Treasury Regulations combine employer-financed annuity and
death benefit plans covering an employee into a single plan, even
though they were the subject of separate agreements, or contracts, and
the regulations state that a future possibility of an enforceable claim
is sufficient under section 2039 for an employee to "possess the right"
to receive payments. These regulations have been sustained by the
court as a reasonable expression of Congressional intent 0 to include
a joint and survivor annuity in the decedent's gross estate to the extent
that its cost was contributed by the decedent or by the employer under
a nonqualified plan. Congress gave favored treatment to qualified
plans,21 so that annuities or other payments attributable to employer's
contributions will be excluded from the decedent's gross estate if they
are made under a qualified plan.22 As noted above the definition of
"insurance" under section 2039 (a), has been left to the courts. Haynes
did not require premiums, funding, or actuarial data, and said that
"health insurance" should be given the broad general meaning that
"lffe insurance" had been given in Le Gierse.23 Therefore, the court
in the instant case is not correct in requiring either funding or the
use of actuarial data to compute a reserve value before it will recog-
nize a valid insurance policy because these are not the essential
criteria for insurance.2 4 Risk shifting and risk distribution are the
essential features.25 There is little question that this was done in the
19. 321 F.2d at 637 (2d Cir. 1963).
20. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 470 (1954). See text accompanying note
2 supra.
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2039(c).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 401.
23. the two decisions may be validly synthesized as to what are the elements of
insurance, although the term insurance is being taken from both the income tax and
the estate tax sections of the code, and although it is common for a term's definition
to vary with the code section in which it is used.
24. See notes 6 & 15 supra.
25. Risk was effectively shifted from McCobb to Standard Oil, which distributed
the risk over the large number of executives, who were covered by the plan. Contingent
on decedent's death, Standard Oil was able to employ funds equal to possible death
benefit payments toward the production of income. Standard Oil gambled as to
whether it would lose the utility of these funds at an early date or have the decedent's
continued employment toward the production of income in excess of the eventual
exp nse of making the death benefit payments. Standard Oil had the same agreement
with all executives covered by the death benefit plan, and the company assumed that
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instant case. The court omitted from its quotation from Le Gierse
the crucial requirement that the risk being shifted and distributed be
the risk of premature death.26 The court mentioned the risk of prema-
ture death in its discussion of Treganowan, but it failed to distinguish
that risk from the risk of extreme longevity. The risk which is shifted
determines whether there is an insurance policy or an annuity.2 7 Con-
trary to the court's opinion, the company did in fact gamble with the
decedent; in the combined plans it assumed the risk that decedent
might lead a long life. This is the seller's risk in an annuity,8 the
proceeds of which are not excluded from the decedent's estate by
section 2039(a). The court adds a touch of irony by concluding that
"the company did nothing more than promise to pay a sum certain to
a named beneficiary upon the death of a retired employee." This
neatly fits a widely accepted definition of insurance.29 Although the
death benefit plan has the character of insurance, the primary em-
phasis when it is combined with the annuity plan is protection against
the risk of extreme longevity rather than protection against the risk
of premature death. The distinction between the type of risk in an
annuity and an insurance policy is implicit in the treasury regulation
used by the court 0 and the legislative history of section 2039(a). 31
This court reached the proper result for reasons which will not bear
scrutiny. Mere bookkeeping entries will cure the lack of funding,
and reserve value can be computed by using commonly available
only a few of these would die in one year. Therefore, the profits made for Standard Oil
by these executives would absorb the amount of death benefits paid each year, and the
company thereby distributed the risk that it had assumed.
26. "That life insurance is desirable from an economic and social standpoint as a
device to shift and distribute risk of loss from premature death is unquestionable."
312 U.S. at 539.
27. "An annuity is usually defined as being an obligation to pay a stated sum ...
to a stated recipient, such payments to terminate upon the death of the designated
beneficiary:' 1 APPLEiMAN, INSURANCE § 81, at 71 (1941). An insurance policy
holder exchanges the possibility of great loss through premature death for a smaller,
fixed loss, which he can absorb without financial disaster. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE §
2, at 9 (1941). "[Alnnuity and insurance are opposites . . . . From the company's
viewpoint, insurance looks to longevity, annuity to transiency." 312 U.S. at 541.
28. The court assessed the risk assumed by the issuer of an annuity, and stated that
"even if a substantial number live beyond their predicted demise, the company
issuing the annuity ...is obligated to make the annuity payments on the basis of the
mortality prediction reflected in the contract." SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 65, 70 (1959).
29. "[O]ne party, for a compensation called the 'premium,' assumes particular
risks of the other party and promises to pay to him or his nominee a certain or
ascertainable sum of money on a specified contingency ...." 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 1,
at 471 (1945). A life insurance policy is a contract to pay a stated sum to the
named beneficiary on the death of the insured. 1 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE § 1, at 2 n.1
(1941).
30. See note 7 supra.
31. See note 5 supra.
1964]
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life expectancy and annuity tables. This sham might satisfy the court,
but likely the court's intention was to implement a policy decision re-
quiring a commercial insurance policy instead of self-insurance;32 if de-
cedent himself had purchased an insurance policy, the premiums
would normally be paid in after-tax dollars, and failure to tax the
decedent on imputed income equal to premiums necessary to purchase
a death benefit plan means that the entire amount escapes taxation
when the death benefit payments are held to be insurance.3 The cost
of life insurance purchased on the life of an employee by an employer
under a qualified plan is still taxable in part to the employee, when
there is no intervening trust. The amount taxable is the net term
cost at risk, which is the amount of money needed to buy insurance
equal to the difference between the face value of the policy and its
cash surrender value. The proceeds are not taxable to the employee's
estate at his death. If the payments in the instant case are not taxed
to the estate they will be given preferred treatment over qualified
plans and defeat Congressional intent.
Taxation-Federal Income Taxation-Prosecution of
Shareholder under Section 7201 for Charging
Personal Expenditures to Corporation's
Expense Account
The defendant, president and sole stockholder of a corporation, was
convicted of criminal tax evasion because he had failed to include in
his income tax returns for the years 1954-1956 personal expenditures1
which admittedly had been improperly charged to various expense ac-
counts of the corporation. Internal Revenue agents twice had ex-
amined the corporate books and had informed the defendant after
each examination that such expenditures were includible in his gross
income. The defendant's continued failure to report such expenditures
as income led to his indictment in 1961 on three counts of criminal tax
32. Certainly the term "policies" used in the statute suggests such an approach.
33. Rev. Rul. 57-191, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 162.
1. These expenditures totaled $212,328.97 for the three years. An additional $602,
692.11 had been charged to defendant's personal expense account, but it appears that
the defendant bad repaid this amount to the corporation so that its treatment was not
challenged. See Brief for Appellant, p. 5, United States v. Durant, 324 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1963). It was stipulated by the parties that the defendant derived economic
benefit from these expenditures. The nature of this "economic" benefit was suggested
by the court when it discussed the "defendant's benefactions to various ladies" as a
"nurture of cordial relations with them." 324 F.2d at 864.
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evasion. The defendant denied any criminal liability on the grounds
that the expenditures involved were loans and thus not income and
further claimed that, even if the expenditures were income, there was
no evidence that he had willfully attempted to evade taxes. A federal
district court found him guilty on each count of willful failure to
report income in violation of section 7201 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, held, affirmed. Failure by a corporate officer and sole stock-
holder to report as income personal expenditures charged to corporate
expense accounts after repeated warnings that such expenditures
should be included in income constitutes a willful attempt to evade
the payment of income tax. United States v. Durant, 324 F.2d 859 (7th
Cir. 1963).3
The courts generally have found that the transfer, either directly or
indirectly, of corporate funds in such a manner that the benefit of the
funds goes to a corporate stockholder constitutes income to the re-
cipient. When the benefits have been in the form of money, as they
were here, and not intended as compensation,4 the courts have usually
found the amounts received to be income, relying on one of two
theories.5 Perhaps the most frequently applied theory has been that
such money constitutes a "disguised dividend" to the stockholder.6
Such payments are dividends often only because the court so charac-
terizes them. (This often is a fiction, for, in some instances, the cor-
poration may not have intended such benefits as dividends). The
2. 208 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Ill. 1962). The defendant was fined a total of $15,000
and sentenced to the custody of the attorney general for a period of 60 days on each
count. The wording of the statute.is as follows: "§ 7201. Attempt to Evade or Defeat
Tax. Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax im-
posed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other penalties provided
by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of
prosecution." INT. R!v. CODE OF 1954, § 7201. (Emphasis supplied.)
In a recent case a court held that § 7201 defines two possible crimes-an attempt
to evade or defeat (1) any tax, or (2) the payment thereof. Cohen v. United States,
297 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1962).
3. Petition for cert. filed, 36 U.S.L. WEEK 3305 (U.S. Feb. 28, 1964) (No. 875).
4. Note that the Internal Revenue Service would probably not be anxious to claim
that the taxpayer has received compensation from the corporation, as this amount
would then be deductible by the corporation as a business expense.
5. But the court need not adopt any theory as to the nature of the income. See note
25 infra.
6. Section 61(a) (7) of the Code provides for the inclusion of dividends in gross
income. It has been held that, where expenses incurred by the president and sole
stockholder of a corporation were not shown to be corporate expenses, these expenses
were constructive dividends to the taxpayer. Louis Marks, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
1600 (1963). Cf. Oyster Shell Prod. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.
1963); A. John Cohen, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1189 (1963); Isaac Engel Realty Co.,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1372 (1963).
7. Regensburg v. Commissioner, 144 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 783
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application of this theory is limited by the Code's requirement that
before a dividend can be found there must be accumulated or current
earnings and profits.8 The Code thus would permit the finding, for tax
purposes, of a dividend if it met the aforementioned requirement even
though the dividend would be illegal under state law. Even if there
are no current or accumulated earnings and profits to support con-
structive dividend treatment, the court may find that the stockholder
has embezzled the funds, which, under the 1961 decision in James v.
United States,9 constitute income to the embezzler. While the above
theories are instruments for a finding that the taxpayer did receive in-
come, they must be supported by facts permitting their application,
though such application will usually be contested. A favorite argu-
ment for supporting the taxpayer's contention that the funds received
were not income is that the money was extended to him as a loan by
the corporation.10 Especially indicative of a loan is the situation in
which the stockholder gives the corporation some evidence of the
indebtedness." A necessary prerequisite for finding that a withdrawal
(1944). In this case, the court, although supporting a Tax Court finding that the
taxpayer had received a dividend, noted that it would also have been plausible to find
that the transaction actually involved a loan to the stockholder by the corporation.
"To constitute a distribution taxable as a dividend, the benefit received by the share-
holder need not be considered as a dividend either by the corporation or its share-
holders, declared by the board of directors, nor other formalities of a dividend declara-
tion need be observed, if on all the evidence there is a distribution of available earnings
or profits under a claim of right or without any expectation of repayment." Clark v.
Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 711 (9th Cir. 1959).
8. Section 316 of the Code defines dividend for income tax purposes.
9. 366 U.S. 213 (1961), 15 VAND. L. REv. 660 (1962). The Supreme Court held
that embezzled funds must be included in the taxpayer's gross income in the year in
which they are misappropriated, thus overruling Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404
(1946), which had held that embezzled funds were not income.
If the James case were not controlling here (while it would control the question of
whether the embezzled funds were income it probably would not permit a finding of
willfulness since the actions in question occurred while Wilcox was in effect), the
defendant could avoid a conviction for tax evasion if he could prove that he had
embezzled the funds. Chan Shing Ho v. United States, 186 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1951);
Currier v. United States, 166 F.2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948) (constructive dividend found).
Along this same theoretical line, if defendant were to claim to be an embezzler it could
be claimed that the corporation condoned the action since he is the sole stockholder.
Thus the funds would not have been embezzled. Indeed it has been held that a
stockholder cannot embezzle funds from his wholly owned corporation. Davis v.
United States, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955). But this holding seems incorrect if one
applies the theory that a corporation is a separate legal entity, distinct and apart from
its stockholders.
10. Robert Binda, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1195 (1963); Carl L. White, 17 T.C.
1562 (1952). Essential to a finding of a loan is that at the time of the payment the
parties intended that the money be repaid. If it could be shown, as in the instant case,
that the advance was made with no intention of repayment, it is doubtful if the payment
would be treated as a loan even if entered on the corporate books under an account
such as "Accounts Receivable-Officers."
11. Soden v. Bookwalter, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9329 (W.D. Mo. 1963). There the
court noted as circumstances indicative of a loan the execution of notes, the presence
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is a loan is the presence at the time of withdrawal of an intention of
the parties to repay.'2
This case is one of the few in which a court has held a stockholder
of a wholly owned corporation liable for criminal fraud under section
7201 for failure to report as income personal expenditures charged
to corporate expense accounts.13 Before discussing the element of
fraud under the Internal Revenue Code, two distinctions should be
made. The first is that between civil and criminal fraud under the
Code. Suits under section 6653(b), which imposes a penalty for civil
fraud of fifty per cent of the underpayment assessed, are quite fre-
quent.14 An intentional failure to disclose income from various sources,
or an attempt to hide the sources of income, will satisfy a finding of
civil fraud.15 On the other hand, the case at bar involves criminal
fraud under section 7201, so that cases involving civil fraud have
limited relevance. Second, the two related sections dealing with
criminal fraud tend to be confused. Section 7203 makes it a misde-
meanor to willfully fail to file a return, supply information on the
return, or pay tax, while section 7201, under which the instant case
was brought, makes it a felony to willfully attempt to evade or defeat
tax.16 Both sections are similar to the extent that they require the
of a business purpose, and the fact that very little surplus was on hand out of which
a dividend could have been paid. Several articles have discussed whether a withdrawal
is a loan or a constructive dividend and what elements are determinative of the issue.
Werner, Stockholder Withdrawals-Loans or Dividendsp, 10 TAx L. R-v. 569 (1955);
Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 540 (1958); Note, Disguised Dividends: A Comprehensive Survey,
3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 207 (1956).
12. Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1959) (citing other
cases).
13. A case with facts similar to those of the instant case is Max P. Lash, 15 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 453 (1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1957). The taxpayer
had charged his personal expenses to improper corporate expense accounts. He was
held to have violated § 293(b) of the 1939 Code (§ 6653(b) of the 1954 Code)
covering civil fraud. Lash had previously been convicted of criminal tax evasion for
engaging in practices similar to those of defendant Durant. Lash v. United States,
221 F.2d 237 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 826 (1955). The Lash case seems to
be good authority for the instant decision, but the failure of the court to cite it may be
evidence that each case of willfulness must be decided on its facts alone. See also
United States v. Brill, 270 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1959), where an accountant was con-
victed of felonious tax evasion in filling out a corporate officer's tax forms.
14. E.g., Max P. Lash, supra note 13. A case with facts strongly indicative of an
intent to evade taxes is Hub Cloak & Suit Co., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1033 (1956). The
taxpayer was a dominating stockholder and accountant who kept the corporate books and
was certainly aware of correct accounting procedure. Nevertheless, he reported as
corporate expenses his own personal expenditures. He was found guilty of civil fraud
under what is now § 6653(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. On this type
of fraud see Whiteaker, Federal Income Taxes and the Civil Fraud Penalty, 7 VAND. L.
Im-v. 366 (1954).
15. Sam D. Hecht, 16 T.C. 981 (1951).




conduct to be willful. However, section 7201 appears to have a more
stringent requirement of willfulness than section 7203-the former re-
quiring some affirmative overt act,17 the latter requiring only an inten-
tional failure or omission.18 What constitutes willful conduct is a sub-
jective matter,19 and the taxpayer's actual intent is controlling.20 It is
a question of fact which will usually be determined by inferences
drawn from the particular circumstances. 21 Neither does negligence,
gross negligence, mistake, or lax conduct constitute the requisite will-
fulness under section 7 2 01,m nor does a mere understatement of in-
come.23 It has been stated, however, that a repetitive pattern of certain
objectionable conduct can be considered in determining whether the
taxpayer's behavior was willful.
The court in the instant case quickly disposed of defendant's con-
tention that the withdrawals were loans rather than income, finding no
evidence to sustain the contention. This ruling was supported by the
corporation's carrying the expenditures on its books as expenses rather
than as accounts receivable, by the lack of any evidence of indebted-
ness given the corporation by the defendant, and by the general nature
of the payments (no interest was charged and no date for repayment
designated). The court advanced no theory as to why the expenditures
were income to the defendant but, having disposed of his loan theory,
assumed them to be income. The court also found that there was
sufficient evidence to support the trial judge's finding that the defend-
ant willfully attempted to evade taxes during the three year period.
A significant contributing factor to the determination of willfulness
17. Spies v. United States, supra note 16, at 499. A good example of an affirmative
act found sufficient for conviction of § 7201 fraud is illustrated by a taxpayer's use of
two sets of books for purposes of concealing certain sources of income in order to
evade taxes. United States v. Glascott, 216 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1954).
18. One court made the distinction between willfulness under § 7201 and § 7203 as
follows. In a misdemeanor action under § 7203 willfulness means bad purpose, but
the requirement for a felony conviction under § 7201 is much higher-there must be
bad faith, an evil intent, to sustain a conviction. Abdul v. United States, 254 F.2d 292
(9th Cir. 1958).
19. United States v. Glascott, 216 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1954).
20. Blackwell v. United States, 244 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1957).
21. Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1934). See also Haskell v.
United States, 241 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921 (1957).
22. United States v. Litman, 246 F.2d 206 (3d Cir. 1957); United States v. Glascott,
supra note 19, at 490.
23. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954); United States v. Lindstrom,
222 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1955).
24. Blackwell v. United States, 244 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1957), citing Holland v.
United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), and other cases. See also Blauner v. United States,
293 F.2d 723, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1961) (warnings apparently were given by defendant's
own accountants rather than by government agents); Wolfe v. United States, 261 F.2d
158, 160 (6th Cir. 1958); Abraham Galant, 26 T.C. 354, 365 (1056). Warnings to the
taxpayer by legal counsel would fall within the protection of the attorney-client privilege.
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was the examination of the corporate books by federal agents at two
different times; on each occasion deficiencies were assessed for ex-
penditures similar to those now involved and those deficiencies were
paid by defendant. Although the court agreed with defendant's con-
tention that mere laxity would not constitute willfulness, it pointed
out that circumstances-especially the repeated warnings-indicated
that the defendant's conduct exceeded laxity. The court further ruled
that after the warnings he was aware that these expenditures were
taxable income and that he knew the corporation was paying these
expenses. In addition, on many of his expenditure vouchers the de-
fendant failed to disclose information sufficient to enable the clerks
to determine the proper account, namely the L. A. Durant personal
account, to which the items should be charged. Finally, the court
held that all these factors, complemented by the defendant's continued
improper conduct over a number of years, were sufficient to support
a finding that defendant's behavior was willful.
A notable omission from the court's opinion was any discussion of
a theory upon which the expenditures could be called income. While
the court felt it unnecessary for such a theory to be espoused, 25 it is
interesting to consider possible reasons why the previously mentioned
theories were not used. It may be that the corporate earnings history
would not permit a finding of dividends out of earnings and profits.
On the other hand, the court may have avoided the embezzlement
theory since although the James case would allow a finding that em-
bezzled funds were income, the transactions involved here occurred
while Wilcox was in effect, thereby negating any charge of willful-
ness.26 The court appears to have treated the case as one of first
impression since it cited no cases in point.2 7 The instant decision may
well indicate a general tightening down by the courts and the Internal
Revenue Service on tax-evading sole stockholders.2 One incidental
benefit of this tightening will be an enforced observance of the concept
of the separate corporate entity. If one is to enjoy the advantages of
25. "Appellant makes much of the fact that the government has not fixed a label of
some kind on the funds that he took from his corporation. It is not necessary to
describe them as additional salary, illicit bonuses, or commissions, or anything more
than wrongful diversions, since, as above mentioned, substance controls over form,
and taxation is concerned with the actual command over the property taxed." Davis v.
United States, 226 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1955).
Of course, from the corporate standpoint it may be very important what label is put
on these expenditures. if dividends, then they would not be deductible for tax
purposes, but if compensation then they would be a properly deductible corporate
expense.
26. See note 9 supra.
27. See note 13 supra.
28. On this point see Murphy, Recent Developments in the Fraud Field, N.Y.U. 17TH
INST. ON FED. TAx 483 (1959).
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limited liability, and possibly lower corporate tax rates, he should
be expected to live up to his obligations as well. The defendant clearly
was using the corporation as his alter ego. The Government's success
may encourage prosecuting attorneys to intensify their efforts to prose-
cute tax evaders. However, the future applicability of this case will be
limited. It would not apply, for example, to persons who honestly had
taken out corporate funds as a loan and later found themselves unable
to repay the money. It is also important to note that the conviction
was based in large part upon the prior warnings given the defendant.
Absent these warnings, his conduct, which here was denoted willful-
ness, probably would have been held to be merely negligence.20 While
it may be contended that unduly harsh punishment is being inflicted
upon the defendant,30 this does not alter the fact that the decision
represents a correct application of the statute. While the court neither
distinguished between willfulness under section 7201 and 7203 nor
expressly mentioned any affirmative act of this defendant, as suggested
by the Spies case as being illustrative of willfulness, 31 the evidence
seems sufficient to support a finding of willfulness under section 7201.
Trademarks-Risk of a Trademark Becoming Generic
Solely by Non-discriminatory Use by a
Majority of the Public
Defendant, a manufacturer of vacuum bottles, threatened to use the
word "thermos" on its products. Plaintiff sued to prevent infringement
of its registered trademark, "Thermos." Defendant counterclaimed,
asking that the trademark be cancelled since the word "thermos" had
29. While one might construe the court's language as stating that repeated negligent
conduct becomes willful by the very fact of repetition, this would be a distortion. The
court has stated that the negligent conduct became willful only after the repeated warn-
ings to the defendant. But see the district court opinion stating that: "There is a point
of repetition at which action originally careless or negligent becomes deliberate and
wilful." 208 F. Supp. at 895. This is probably just a careless use of phraseology as the
judge had just previously referred to the agents' warnings as signaling the end of
negligence and the beginning of willfulness.
30. It seems safe to assume that the defendant's troubles are just beginning. He
faces a possible fifty per cent penalty upon the tax assessed under § 6653(b) of the
Code. The criminal conviction, however, will not be res judicata or collateral estoppel
of the finding of fraud in the civil suit. Estate of W. Favre Slater, 21 CCH Tax Ct.
Mem. 1355 (1962). The same would be true if the defendant were acquitted in this
criminal prosecution. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). The criminal action
was probably brought first because of the six year statute of limitations. INT. REv.
CODE. OF 1954, § 3748.
31. See notes 16 and 17 supra and accompanying text.
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become generic.' Defendant introduced into evidence opinion polls
which showed that only about twelve per cent of the general public
recognized the word "thermos" as indicating either the source or the
manufacturer of a specific brand of vacuum bottle, while seventy-five
per cent used the word as the common description of a vacuum bottle.
Further evidence showed that in 1922 plaintiff had been warned that
"thermos" was becoming generic3 and had taken steps to insure that its
trademark was correctly used in the trade; however, it made little
attempt to prevent the general public from using "thermos" in a
generic manner until 1953.4 Furthermore, when companies or in-
dividuals refused to stop making improper use of the trademark, the
Thermos Company did not bring suit to enforce its rights.5 Finally, in
1962 the defendant's actions forced plaintiff to choose between aban-
doning the trademark or protecting it by bringing the present action.
The district court held that the word "thermos" had become descrip-
tive of the product to a large part of the public due to plaintiffs lack
of diligence in requiring proper use of the trademark.6 Therefore, said
the court, the defendant would not be enjoined from using the word
"thermos" with a small "t" in conjunction with the possessive form of
one of defendant's own trademarks.7 However, since a minority of the
public still recognized the use of the word as a trademark and the
defendant conceded that the trademark was recognized within the
industry, the court refused to cancel it. Plaintiff appealed, alleging that
"Thermos" had sufficient secondary meaning to be entitled to complete
protection from infringement. In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
held, affirmed. An action for infringement will not lie where the trade-
mark is considered a generic term by a substantial majority of the
public, regardless of the efforts of the manufacturer to save his trade-
1. A trademark will be cancelled "at any time if the registered mark becomes the
common descriptive name of an article . . .. Lanham Trade-Mark Act § 14(c), 76
Stat. 771 (1962), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (Supp. IV, 1963).
2. The district court accepted the defendant's survey as accurately reflecting public
opinion. American Thermos Prod. Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 207 F. Supp. 9, 21
(D. Conn. 1962). The proper taking of public opinion polls has been discussed in
several recent notes. See generally Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial
of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1060); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 619 (1961).
3. American Thermos Bottle Co. v. W.T. Grant Co., 279 Fed. 151 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
282 Fed. 426 (1st Cir. 1922).
4. 207 F. Supp. at 17, 18.
5. "Action has been contemplated; however . . . . there is a very real danger that
some 'liberal' might decide, particularly, if he himself has been in the habit of using
'Thermos' as a generic term, to declare it that. Damage of an adverse decision would
be irreparable as you know." 207 F. Supp. at 18-19 n.6. See also id. at 17-18 n.4.
6. Id. at 27, 28.
7. Examples are "Aladdin's thermos" and "Aladdin's Huckelberry Hound thermos."
In addition the defendant could not use "thermos" as the first word in any sentence and
could not use the words "original" or "genuine" in connection with "thermos." Id. at 27.
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mark. King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d
577 (2d Cir. 1963).a
Determining whether a trademark has lost its ability to indicate
source and has become a generic term for a product has been a
difficult problem for the courts. The majority of the cases arise upon
the expiration of patents on trademark products.9 During the life of
the patent a company will often use its trademark as the sole name
for the product. In both the Aspirin0 and Cellophane" cases the
manufacturers had used those terms exclusively; the closest generic
terms were "acetyl salicylic acid"' 2 and "transparent gycerinated
cellulose hydrate regenerated from viscose,"'13 respectively. Thus, when
the patents expired and other companies began to manufacture these
products, it was necessary that they use the trademark names, those
being the only names the public knew for the product. "To say other-
wise would be to hold that... [the producer] could take the benefit
and advantage of the patent ... and yet when the end was reached
disregard the public dedication [of the trademark] and practically
perpetuate indefinitely an exclusive right."14 The test applied to see
if the trademark passes to the public domain is basically one of fact:
What does the public understand the term to mean? 5 If the primary
connotation is source, the mark is entitled to protection from infringe-
ment; if the primary connotation is only a general product itself, the
term is generic and may be used by all manufacturers.' There is some
conflict regarding the following factors: How large a percentage of the
8. King-Seeley Co. succeeded to all interests of American Thermos Bottle Co. after
the conclusion of the first trial.
9. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co.,
85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 Fed. 505 (S.D.N.Y.
1921).
10. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., supra note 9.
11. DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9.
12. 272 Fed. at 510.
13. 85 F.2d at 77.
14. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., supra note 9, at 185-86.
15. "The single question . . . in all these cases, is merely one of fact: What do the
buyers understand by the word for whose use the parties are contending? If they
understand by it only the kind of goods sold, then ... it makes no difference whatever
what efforts the plaintiff has made to get them to understand more." Bayer Co. v.
United Drug Co., supra note 9, at 509. "[Tjhis case does not properly turn on aban-
doment, nor does it even turn on the question whether the word cellophane was at
one time more than a descriptive term. The real problem is what it meant to the
buying public during the period covered by the present suit." DuPont Cellophane Co.
v. Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9, at 77.
16. VAiDENBUrH, TRADENLm LAW AND PocEDuRa § 9.20, at 196. (1959). Call-
mann recognizes this rule, but criticizes it for being harsh in that it will cause a trade-
mark owner, who is making a bona fide effort to save his mark to lose it because of
public opinion which is beyond his control. 3 CAirsANN, UNFAIR CosPzrprIoN AND
TRADE-mARKS 1149-56 (2d ed. 1950).
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public must consider the term generic before it in fact becomes
generic?1  How much weight is to be given the fact that there are
other available generic terms for the given product?18 Finally, what
effect is to be given to the efforts of a manufacturer to save his trade-
mark?19 In Selchow v. Baker 0 and Marks v. Polaroid Corp.,21 the
courts indicated that a trademark would not be declared generic until
the public as a whole no longer recognized it as a trademark. The
Marks court stated that "where the possibility of some deception re-
mains real and the need of a competitor to satisfactorily describe the
product is satisfied by several common nouns or adjectives suitable for
that purpose, the Courts will protect the interest of the owner in his
trademark."2 2 The Lanham Act states that a registered mark will
be deemed abandoned "when any course of conduct of the registrant,
including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark to
lose its significance as an indication of origin."2 In the Senate hear-
ings this section was thought to mean that "a company that has a good
trade-mark and is making every effort to maintain its right, should
not lose the right because the public wants to use that name."2 4 Re-
cent cases, however, seem to repudiate the earlier Selchow case,2 dis-
regard the congressional intent, and hold that an all-too-adoring public
is a peril to which all trademark advertising is subject-"its very success
17. Some cases require that the public as a whole no longer recognize the trade-
mark. E.g., Marks v. Polaroid Corp., 129 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955), aft'd, 237
F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1956); Selchow v. Baker, 93 N.Y. 59 (1883). Other cases require
only that a substantial majority of the public consider the trademark generic. E.g.,
Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251, 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 910 (1962); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9; Bayer
Co. v. United Drug Co., supra note 9.
18. Marks v. Polaroid Corp., supra note 17, at 270. The availability of other generic
terms is not controlling. Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9;
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., supra note 9. See generally VANDENBJEGH, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 195. (Supp. 1963, at 60-61).
19. "This opinion [a Belgian case, as yet unreported, holding "Thermos" a valid
trademark in that country] is perhaps the most striking illustration of the rule of law
prevalent in other parts of the world, that an established trade-mark is lost only be-
cause of acts of commission or omission on the part of its owner, and not because of
the habits of the public." 3 CALrLvrN, op. cit. supra note 16 (Supp. 1963, at 42).
See also Selchow v. Baker, supra note 17, at 69. Contra, DuPont Cellophane Co. v.
Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9; Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., supra note 9.
20. 93 N.Y. 59 (1883).
21. 129 F. Supp. 243 (D. Mass. 1955).
22. Id. at 270.
23. Latham Trade-Mark Act § 45(b), 60 Stat. 444 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1127(b)
(1958).
24. Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Patents,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1944).
25. American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1953);
DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., supra note 9; Bayer Co. v. United Drug
Co., supra note 9.
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may prove its failure."26 The majority of American courts seem to
disregard all factors except the understanding of the particular term in
question by a substantial majority of the public.27 Thus, once the
general public thinks of a trademark as a class description only, the
trademark may be used by competitors as long as they do not deceive
the public as to source-regardless of either the efforts of the owner
to save his mark or alternative names available for the competitor's
use.2
In the instant case the court extends the Aspirin and Cellophane
doctrines to cover trademarks of non-patented goods.2 9 The court re-
jects the idea that the efforts of the trademark owner should be given
weight, stating that it is "not convinced that the trademark's loss of
distinctiveness was the result of some failure on the plaintiff's part....
[T]he fact is the word 'thermos' had entered the public domain beyond
recall."30 It further rejects the idea that the trademark should be pro-
tected if there is another generic term available to describe the pro-
duct. In this case "vacuum bottle" had been used for many years as
a generic term, "but," states the court, "the test is not what is available
as an alternative to the public, but what the public's understanding is
of the word it uses."31 Finally, the court rejects the theory that the
mark becomes generic only when the public as a whole so uses it.
Instead its test is whether to a substantial majority of the public the
term connotes merely a general product and not the source of a
particular brand of that product: "there is not enough dual use
to support King-Seeley's claim to monopoly of the word as a trade-
mark."az The court, however, acknowledging that a minority of
the public knew the word "thermos" as a trademark and that it was
26. American Chicle Co. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., supra note 25, at 562.
27. Supra note 9.
28. "The test of whether or not a mark has become generic involves a determination
of what does it mean to purchasers of the goods or services. Where the former mark
has become generic to one segment of the public, the fact that it still serves as an
indication of origin to another small segment will not save it. . . . The fact that there
are other words available to purchasers to identify the goods or services or that the
owner of the alleged mark has taken steps to endeavor to prevent the mark from
becoming generic will not prevent a mark from being generic if it serves to identify the
goods or services rather than the origin thereof." VANnBrtrGH, op. cit. supra note 16,
at 196. Even if a company does not have a valid registered trademark, a competitor
cannot duplicate the owner's names, displays, or marks so as to deceive a customer as to
the actual manufacturer. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896);
Feathercombs, Inc. v. Solo Prods. Corp., 306 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1962); Blisscraft of
Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961); American Chicle Co.
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1953).
29. Vacuum bottles were imported into this country from Germany prior to 1900 and
had never been patented in this country.
30. 321 F.2d at 579.
31. Id. at 580.
32. Id. at 581.
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universally recognized as such in the trade, refused to cancel the
trademark registration. But since a substantial majority of the public
did not recognize the trademark, it held that the defendant would
not infringe the trademark by using the word "thermos" with a small
"t" in conjunction with one of defendant's own trademarks so as to
prevent any confusion as to source of the product.3
3
The equities in trademark cases are difficult to determine.3 4 The
public is entitled to be able to buy a brand product with the assurance
that one, and only one, company has made it. On the other hand, if
the public uses a brand name to mean only a class of products it is
deceived if given a particular brand alone. Whereas protection of a
trademark means that other companies are deprived of an equal op-
portunity to compete for the sale of the goods, it is nevertheless argu-
able that a company that has spent time and money to popularize a
trademark should be protected from another company's exploiting the
former's trademark and good will. It would seem that a new company
should be able to use freely any generic term to describe its product.
The court in the instant case felt that the rights of the trademark
holder should be governed solely by what the trademark connotes to
the public. The decision is based primarily on maximum protection
for the consumer;35 the defendant was not seriously damaged by not
being able to use "thermos" on his vacuum bottles (his sales had been
increasing much faster than those of the plaintifE ). The decision, by
allowing the defendant to use "thermos," insures that the general pub-
lic (which uses "thermos" generically) will have a chance to buy any
brand vacuum bottle offered by the retailer. As a leading text writer
has pointed out, this doctrine is a harsh one as applied to trademark
owners.aT However, by requiring the defendant to use the possessive
of one of its trademarks with "thermos" and by enjoining any use of
the words "original" and "genuine" in advertising, the court insures
that the minority that still think of "Thermos" as a brand name will
not be deceived into buying the defendant's product when they in
33. The remedy is substantially the same as the one applied in the Aspirin case,
supra note 9, where the trade still recognized the word aspirin as a trademark. The
Cellophane case, supra note 9, required the defendant to state that it was filling an
order with its own product if a customer ordered only cellophane without any other
name. The district court required Aladdin to follow the same procedure. 207 F. Supp.
at 27.
34. 321 F.2d at 581.
35. ibid.
36. In 1945 plaintiff's sales were $5,300,000; they increased to $13,280,000 in 1960.
Defendant's sales in 1945 were $500,000; this increased to $6,800,000 in 1960. Thus,
defendant's sales increased by a factor of more than twelve while plaintiff's increased by
a factor of less than three. Reply Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 16, King-Seeley
Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963).
37. 3 CALLMANN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 1149-56.
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fact want the plaintiff's. Still, the plaintiff has the benefit of the word
"Thermos" in its stylized forms, may advertise it as the "original" or
"genuine" Thermos, and is given a great deal of free advertising by the
public's continued use of the name as a household word.
The instant case will have a substantial effect on owners of trade-
marks that have become closely identified with a single product. It
clearly indicates that if a substantial majority of the public considers
the trademark as the name for the class rather than a brand name other
companies may use the trademark. The court's reasoning indicates
that trademarks such as Kleenex, Scotch brand tape, Vaseline, B.V.D.,
Band-Aid, and Q-Tips may be in danger of falling into the public
domain.38 The economic value of trademarks is substantial, and large
sums of money are expended to popularize them.39 The instant case
points up the danger of excessive careless advertising, in view of the
court's exaltance of the public's understanding of a word and its cor-
responding disregard of other factors. A trademark owner must exercise
extreme caution in order to prevent an enthusiastic public from appro-
priating his trademark for its own use.40 It is in this area of preventive
law that this case will have its greatest import. In order to retain a
trademark, the owner should maintain a clipping service, both in trade
and general circulation publications, to discover all improper uses of
his mark. He must then attempt to stop these misuses either by a let-
ter explaining that the word is a trademark 4' or, if necessary, by suit
for unfair competition to prevent infringement or dilution of the
mark.42 In all advertising the owner will have to educate the public
38. The plaintiff cited a number of cases which bad upheld dual functioning trade-
marks; however, the court indicated that it was a question of fact whether or not
a given mark still had sufficient use as a trademark to justify its continued protection.
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 9-11, King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,
supra note 37. In the Q-Tips case the court distinguished that trademark from words
like aspirin and cellophane on grounds that customers had not yet come to regard
Q-Tips as a generic term. Q-Tips, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 108 F. Supp. 845 (D.N.J.
1952); 3 CALLmANN, op. cit. supra note 16 (Supp. 1963, at 43). Thus it would seem
to be only a matter of time before some of these other trademarks pass into the public
domain.
39. 3 CAL..AvN, op. cit. supra note 16, at 1149-51.
40. For general comments dealing with protection of trademarks see ibid.; RonT,
Tm NEv Tr.nE-MmA MANuAL 31-38 (1947); ThE UNrrnm STATES TIIuE Au C As-
socrATION, TRADEMAuK MANAG_ MNT (1960) [hereinafter cited as TRADEMAJUC MANAGE-
MENT]; VANDENBOmGi!, op. cit. supra note 16, at 169-87.
41. Most violations by writers and publishers are unintentional, and a letter explain-
ing the proper use of a trademark will correct the problem for future uses by that party.
TRaD wUC MANAGEMENT 67-88. It is interesting to note that King-Seeley began to send
letters of protest only immediately prior to the beginning of litigation in this case. In
1957 they sent only 178; in 1958 they sent 270; in 1959 they sent 1109; in 1960 they
sent 950; and in 1961 they sent 1171. 207 F. Supp. at 19 n.7.
42. A trademark owner has a right to recover damages under the Lanham Act for
infringements by members of the trade; as to members of the general public or news-
paper publishers the owner can only get an injunction against future improper uses as
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that his mark is a brand name and not a generic description for the
product itself.43 The use of a simple and popular descriptive term ac-
companying the trademark in advertising will be the best insurance.44
The possibility of this alternative alleviates much of the hardship
which might result from the principles embodied in this decision. Also,
using one trademark on several different products will aid the public
to recognize the mark as a brand name and not as a generic term for a
single product.45 All these preventive measures should be taken as,
early as possible, because once the public begins to use a mark in a
generic sense, it becomes increasingly difficult to recapture the mark.
46
Trade Regulation-Unfair Competition-Use of
Antidilution Statute as Independent
Ground for Relief
'Polaroid," a word coined by plaintiff, is its internationally known
trademark and trade name for a variety of optical, photographic, and
electrical devices. Defendant, a general contractor specializing in
the designing and installation of refrigeration and heating systems in
a three-state area, knowing of plaintiff's earlier use of "Polaroid," had
used "Polaraid" as its trademark and trade name since its incorpora-
tion in 1953. Plaintiff had notified defendant that such use of a name
similar to its own constituted trademark infringement and unfair
long as the infringement is not intentional. Lanham Act § 32, 60 Stat. 437-38 (1946),
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1958).
43. TRADnmrux MANAGEMENT 43-56.
44. E.g., "Corfam* is a remarkable new material for shoe uppers. It is the world's
first poromeric, the result of over a decade of intensive research to create a breathable,
man-made product for shoe uppers .... *Corfam is Du Pont's registered trademark for
its poromeric shoe upper material." N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1964, § 1, p. 57, col. 7.
Since the Cellophane case, supra note 9, and the instant case Du Pont has been very
careful to use its trademarks with a generic term. Du Pont publishes a pamphlet con-
taining instructions on the use of each of its trademarks. A sample page from the
pamphlet on Dacron is reproduced in TRADEI ARK MANAGEMENT 56.
45. Thermos products were diversified in 1954 to include various items of camping
goods. 207 F. Supp. at 19. Apparently this action by the plaintiff came too late also.
As a general rule the use of a trademark on several products is an excellent way to
impress the public that the mark is a brand name and not a generic term. VANDEN-
BURG, op. cit. supra note 16, at 175.
46. TbADEMARE MANAGEMENT 68-69. But see Singer Mfg. Co. v. Redlich, 109 F.
Supp. 623 (S.D. Cal. 1952), which held that Singer was a valid trademark in spite of
its having been declared a generic term in 1896 in Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co.,
163 U.S. 169 (1896). A current example of a preventive measure designed to re-
cover a trademark is the use of the word brand in Scotch "brand" cellophane tape.
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competition, but defendant persisted in using it. Plaintiff instituted an
action in federal court in Illinois for infringement of its federally
recognized trademark, unfair competition in using a trademark and
trade name confusingly similar to its own, and violation of the Illinois
Antidilution Statute.1 The trial court rendered judgment for de-
fendant2 and denied plaintiff's motion for a new trial.3 On appeal in
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed. De-
fendant's use on noncompeting products of a trade name similar
to plaintiff's distinctive and well-known mark is a sufficient ground for
injunctive relief as either unfair competition or a violation of the
Illinois Antidilution Statute, or both. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.,
319 F.2d 830 (7th Cir. 1963).
The term "unfair competition" was used in the United States
originally to supplement the law of technical trademarks by protecting
trade names that had acquired secondary meaning.4 It has since come
to be applied in actions involving noncompeting products.5 Use on non-
competing goods of a trade name with a secondary meaning is
prohibited under several theories based on some possibility of con-
sumer confusion. The theory of confusion of source is that there
exists a likelihood that a product will be purchased in the belief that
it is manufactured or sold by the plaintiff because of his use of the
same or a similar trade name.6 According to the theory of confusion
1. "Every person, association, or union of workingmen adopting and using a mark,
trade name, label or form of advertisement may proceed by suit, and all courts having
jurisdiction thereof shall grant injunctions, to enjoin subsequent use by another of the
same or any similar mark, trade name, label or form of advertisement if there exists a
likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark, trade name, label, or form of advertisement of the prior user, notwithstanding
the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods
or services. . . " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1963).
2. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Iln. 1962).
3. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. InI. 1962).
4. Callmann, Unfair Competition Without Competition? The Importance of the
Property Concept in the Law of Trade-Marks, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 444 (1947).
Secondary meaning "contemplates that a word or phrase originally, and in that sense
primarily, incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the
market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have
been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that,
in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase had
come to mean that the article was his product; in other words, had come to be, to
them, his trade-mark. So it was said that the word had come to have a secondary
meaning, although this phrase, 'secondary meaning,' seems not happily chosen, because,
in the limited field, this new meaning is primary rather than secondary; that is to say,
it is, in that field, the natural meaning." G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 Fed.
369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912), modified and aff'd, 238 Fed. 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 243
U.S. 651 (1917).
5. Callmann, supra note 4, at 445.
6. E.g., Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Bigney & Co., 247 Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918) (sources of "Aunt Jemima" pancake syrup and self-rising
flour likely to be confused); Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73
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of sponsorship, the public may be led to believe that the defendant is
in some way connected with or endorsed by the plaintiff.7 In general,
the likelihood-of-confusion concept is a test for determining whether
the buying public will be harmed by another's use of a mark in a
manner that will connote a relationship with its originator.8
An alternative and more recently developed theory of trademark
protection is that a trademark or trade name is the exclusive property
of its owner,9 and its uniqueness is therefore to be protected whether
or not there is also a danger of harm to the public because of a
possibility of confusion.10 This doctrine, popularly known as the
dilution theory, was introduced in this country by Schechter," who
derived it from a German case which found an infringement of the
famous "Odor' trademark for mouthwash by its use on hardware. 12
The essence of trademark dilution is that the use of a similar mark
on noncompeting products results in a gradual whittling away of a
mark's distinctive quality, or commercial magnetism, and ultimately
in a decline of its advertising appeal as a business symbol. 13 Only
distinctive and well-known marks are generally associated with this
degree of protection because generic or relatively unknown symbols
(2d Cir. 1910) ("Sta-Kleen" tooth brushes marked and wrapped like "Keepclean" toilet
brushes); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Clipper Van Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 524
(E.D.N.Y. 1951) ("Clipper" motor carrier likely to be confused with airplane engaged
in motor haulage incidental to its usual business); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. A. & P.
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa. 1934) (use of "A & P" mark to
advertise cleaning and dyeing business enjoined at suit of grocery chain). But cf. the
following findings of a sufficient possibility of confusion of source as to constitute
unfair competition: L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934)
("Waterman" razor blades and fountain pens); Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d
972 (2d Cir. 1928) ("Yale" flashlights and locks); Bulova Watch Co., v. Stolzberg,
69 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947) ("Bulova" shoes and watches); Armour & Co. v.
Master Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F.2d 201 (S.D. Ohio 1925) ("Armour" tires and meat
products).
7. E.g., Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948) ("Seven-
teen" dresses so closely related to "Seventeen" magazine that public might assume seller
of dresses was sponsored by magazine); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v.
Benson, 15 Cal. 2d 685, 104 P.2d 650 (1940) (adoption of name "The Hollywood
Motion Picture Academy" for dramatic and coaching school led persons to believe it
was connected with plaintiff, generally known as the "Motion Picture Academy").
8. "The fundamental question in cases of trade-mark or unfair competition ...is
whether the public is being misled and deceived, so that a defendant is in effect taking
the advantage of the good will and business reputation that a complainant has built
up .... .Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Prods. Corp., 287 Fed. 243, 246
(S.D.N.Y. 1921). See 3 CALLMAN , UiNIR Co , TrON AN TnAD.EmARxs 1644-45
(2d ed. 1950).
9. See 3 CALLmANN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1642-45.
10. Deering, Trade-Marks on Noncompetitive Products, 36 ORE. L. REv. 1, 3
(1956).
11. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HAIv. L. REv. 813
(1927).
12. Id. at 831-32.
13. 3 CALiwAN, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1643-44.
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are, in a sense, already diluted. Confusion or deception constitute
no part of a charge of dilution, since a mark's distinctiveness can be
lessened by its use on even dissimilar products; the borrowing of a
trademark for use on similar commodities, or those likely to be
connected with a plaintiff's mark, is prohibited under the more estab-
lished theories of confusion of source or confusion of sponsorship.
When courts have considered the dilution theory they have refused
to accept it as a primary basis for relief, but have used it as a make-
weight rationale in cases not involving competition, while grounding
their decisions on findings of a possibility of confusion.14 Four states
have adopted antidilution legislation,' 5 but even the decisions which
have interpreted these statutes have been reluctant to enforce an
allegation of dilution standing alone.16
The court in the principal case, relying primarily upon the Illinois
case of Lady Esther, Ltd. v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Inc., 7 held
14. In Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Prods., Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N.Y. Supp. 821 (1932), aff'd, 262 N.Y. 482,
188 N.E. 30 (1933), generally recognized as the landmark case on dilution, the court
based its decision in part on confusion resulting from defendant's use of a sketch of
a gem and the "Tiffany" name in its advertisements for motion pictures. Although
the dilution theory was applied, elements of a possibility of confusion influenced such
well known "dilution" cases as Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir.
1948); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), rehearing
denied, 12 F.2d 991 (1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 701 (1926); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
15. GA. CODE ANN. § 106-115 (1956); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1963); MAss. LAws ANN. ch. 110, § 7A (1954); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d.
(Supp. 1963). The Georgia and Illinois acts are identical.
16. Only the Massachusetts and New York statutes had been construed prior to the
instant case. The New York statute was considered in Jean Patou, Inc. v. Jacqueline
Cochran, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afJ'd, 312 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1963),
but the court refused to grant relief, and expressed the view that the dilution doctrine
"has been given little weight in the Second Circuit." 201 F. Supp. at 866. The court
added: "It may also be argued that the Lanham Act rejects the dilution doctrine as
a basis for relief in trade-mark cases in that the trade-mark owner must prove the
likelihood of confusion in order to recover. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), 15 U.S.C.A. §
1114(1)." 201 F. Supp. at 867. In reference to the Massachusetts act, the court in Mann
v. Parkway Motor Sales, Inc., 324 Mass. 151, 85 N.E.2d 210 (1949), stated: "The word
'Parkway' having acquired no secondary meaning as designating the plaintiff's place
of business, his rights are not enlarged by G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 110, § 7A . . . ." 324
Mass. at 157, 85 N.E.2d at 214. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToaTs, Explanatory Note,
§ 731, at 109 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) reflects the general view that although the
courts recognize the concept of dilution, "they apply it sparingly."
17. 317 I11. App. 451, 46 N.E.2d 165 (1943). This case granted relief to a manu-
facturer of cosmetics in an action to prohibit use of the "Lady Esther" name by a
retailer of ladies' wearing apparel. Although there was no competition between the
parties, the court based its holdings upon a finding of a possibility of confusion, and
strengthened its opinion by noting the presence of trademark dilution: "[W]e think it
clear that the public might be deceived into thinking there was some connection between
the defendant and the plaintiff companies. And the good-will of plaintiff, which it
had built up at great expense over a period of years, would be whittled away." 317
Ill. App. at 459, 46 N.E.2d at 169.
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that although there was no product competition between the parties,
defendant's use of the trademark "Polaraid" constituted unfair com-
petition. The instant opinion emphasized that lack of proof of in-
stances of actual confusion would be no bar to the cause of action
of unfair competition, since only a showing of a likelihood of con-
fusion, as distinguished from actual confusion, is required.'8 The court
also dismissed defendant's contention that the combination of the word
"polar" signifying cold, and "aid" signifying service, constituted a
legitimate business purpose for selecting "Polaraid" as its business
name, pointing out that defendant's lack of intent to trade on plaintiffs
name was immaterial. 9 In holding that plaintiff was entitled to
independent relief under the Illinois Antidilution Statute, the majority
opinion noted that "Polaroid" is a distinctive coined word that was
originated by plaintiff and had become a strong mark with a wide-
spread reputation, largely as a result of an extensive investment in
promotional efforts. 20 This observation enabled the court to distinguish
a case which had refused to apply the Massachusetts Antidilution.
Statute in an action involving a weaker and more generic word.21
Nevertheless, the court concluded that confusion as to the identity
of the parties is "inescapable . . . due to the close resemblance of
defendant's trade name to that of plaintiff."22 A discussion of the
first cause of action, that of trademark infringement, was therefore
not deemed necessary. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Schnacken-
berg insisted that the dissimilarity of the parties' products and the
small clientele of the defendant could not afford the basis for a
conclusion that a possibility of confusion either of source or of spon-
18. "It is well established in Illinois and by the decisions of this circuit that in-
junctive relief is properly granted in cases involving the use of deceptively similar
names even though there is no proof of actual confusion. It is sufficient to show the
likelihood that confusion will result and that the public might be misled." 319 F.2d
830, 835, quoting from Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 277 F.2d
896, 900 (7th Cir. 1960).
19. 319 F.2d at 835-36.
20. Sales of Polaroid products throughout the United States and in seventy foreign
countries exceeded 450 million dollars, and approximately thirty million dollars had been
spent in advertising them. Defendant's sales, however, never exceeded five hundred
thousand dollars per year, and its annual advertising expenses were less than one
thousand dollars. 319 F.2d at 832.
21. Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 1957). That
court noted that the word "Esquire" "is not a coined word but one firmly established
in the English vocabulary that has by no means become obsolete. . . . In short, the
plaintiff picked an already diluted name as the mark for its 'magazine for men.' . . .
[T]he scope of the protection to which it is entitled is not as broad as that which
might be accorded to a strong, coined name, as 'Kodak,' for instance." 243 F.2d at 543.
The decision added that application of the Massachusetts statute was a matter of
judicial discretion and that its enactment did not expand the application of the dilution
theory to cases not involving infringement or unfair competition. 243 F.2d at 544.
22. 319 F.2d at 837.
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sorship could result from defendant's continued use of the name
'Tolaraid." He emphasized this point by stressing that defendant's
advertisements were placed in skating rink magazines and trade
journals, and that its promotional literature bore likenesses of a smiling
solar face and a polar bear in conjunction with its trade name as a
means of signifying its connection with refrigeration and heating
systems.P Criticizing the majority's application of the antidilution
statute, he noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit had denied relief under the similarly-worded Massachu-
setts Antidilution Statute on the ground that consideration of the
statute is "'primarily a matter for the District Court with which we
would interfere were we convinced that the trial court's conclusion
resulted from an error of law, or an abuse of discretion.'- 24
Several distinguished commentators have doubted whether the dilu-
tion doctrine has been broadened by the four existing antidilution
statutes. 25 Although the instant court specifically held that it could
grant injunctive relief solely on the basis of the Illinois Antidflution
Statute,26 it is perhaps significant that the court's decision was sup-
ported by its finding that defendant's conduct constituted unfair
competition because of a possibility of the public's confusing its mark
with plaintiff's. Nevertheless, the facts of the case provided a classic
opportunity for the application of an antidilution statute because of
the conflict between a very strong and distinctive coined word and
a similar word used as the trade name of a noncompetitive business;
also the products were completely unrelated-photographic and optical
goods on the one hand and heating and refrigeration installations on
the other. However, it is possible that the statute would not receive
so warm a reception in a case involving a relatively unknown or
nondistinctive trade name. It remains to be seen whether this decision
will foster greater reliance upon the state antidilution statutes, and
whether it will help to provide the necessary impetus for incorporation
of the dilution theory into federal legislation.27
23. Id. at 838-39.
24. Id. at 841, quoting from Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., Inc., supra
note 21.
25. See VAmDENB Rcr, Tnh -Em.ri LAW AND PRocamunE 111-12 (1959), Derenberg,
The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIn. L. Rrv.
439, 451-52 (1956); Pattishall, The U.S.A. Courts and the Prevention of Unfair Com-
petition, 53 TRAm&u4m_ REP. 599, 620-22 (1963).
26. 319 F.2d at 837.
27. An antidilution provision appears in the Lindsay Bill, which has been introduced
into Congress several times, most recently as H.R. 4651, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Section 2(a) (3) of this bill defines as an unfair commercial activity any act or practice




Trusts-Cy Pres-Acceptance by Rejection
An action was brought by an executor for construction of a holo-
graphic will by which the testator had willed his estate to an endow-
ment fund for an orphanage maintained by a fraternal organization.
At the time of testator's death, the fraternal organization had closed
the designated orphanage but maintained orphans at similar homes in
other states. The chancery court held that the charitable gift failed,
since at the death of the testator the particular orphanage1 and en-
dowment fund2 no longer existed.3 On appeal to the Tennessee Court
of Appeals, held, reversed. Although the doctrine of cy pres does not
exist in Tennessee, charitable trusts are highly favored by courts of
equity and should be sustained when the manifestly clear intent of the
donor can be carried out. Hardin v. Independent Order of Odd Fel-
lows, 370 S.W.2d 844 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
The cy pres4 doctrine5 has been often misunderstood in the United
States. This is a result of the fact that the doctrine was developed by
the English Lord Chancellor, who served not only as a judicial officer
but also in administrative and legislative capacities.6 Under the doc-
trine of judicial cy pres, which is based on the power stemming from
the inherent jurisdiction of a court of equity, the chancellor would,
when a specifically designated charitable purpose failed, apply a gift
in trust for another charitable purpose if he could ascertain that the
1. The chancellor also decreed that the bequest lapsed because no orphanage existed
at the date of execution of the will. The court of appeals reversed this ruling on two
grounds: (1) the evidence showed that such an orphanage was maintained in 1899, and
the presumption is that a fact once shown to exist continues until the contrary is shown;
and (2) a presumption arises that a testator is informed as to the object of his bounty
and has information as to its existence at the date of execution of the will.
2. The appellate court held that an endowment fund need not have been in existence
at the time the will was written or became operative since the testator might have
intended the creation of such a fund.
3. A subsidiary of the fraternal organization, Tennessee Odd Fellows Home, Inc.,
a party defendant, was organized under a separate charter to operate and take title to
the orphanage; it has received gifts for and administered the support of the orphans
since its incorporation. The court of appeals held the disposition would not be struck
down as a result of the testators failure to use its corporate name. A legacy or devise
will not be defeated by a mistake in the name or description of a legatee when there
is no reasonable doubt as to the person intended.
4. "Cy pres" or "cy pres comme possible" is Norman French which translates to
mean "as near as possible."
5. Although the contemporary doctrine of cy pres has developed from the common
law, the Supreme Court has traced the notion of cy pres as far back as the Roman
Empire, in the Digest of Justinian. Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
6. The Lord Chancellor served as the chief judge of chancery, a member of the
monarch's cabinet, and perpetual president of the two houses of the legislature. 1
HOLDswOaTE, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 397 (1922).
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settlor had a general charitable intent.7 Under his prerogative power,8
on the other hand, the chancellor would, acting as a representative of
the crown, the parens patriae, divert a charitable gift to another chari-
table purpose when the gift would fail for some other reason.9 The
latter power was exercised when a general charitable gift was made
without a trust or when a charitable purpose was illegal, 0 whereas the
former was exercised when a charitable gift was made in trust."
Prerogative cy pres was never a part of American law, since no court
or agency of government has the power of a monarch.12 The doctrine
of judicial cy pres, however, is recognized in the majority of American
jurisdictions.13 Applying that doctrine, if a gift in trust for a particular
7. The courts reasoned that the testator would have desired that the property be
redirected to another charitable purpose had he realized that it would be impossible to
carry out the particular purpose which he had designated. 4 Scoa-r, TRUsTs § 399 (2d
ed. 1956). A more likely motive, however, for the development of the doctrine of
judicial cy pres was that the early chancellors were churchmen, and the law developed
under ecclesiastical influences. Since most ancient gifts for charity were in aid of re-
ligion, the chancellors did not want them to fail. 2A BoGE RT, TnusTs AND TiusT Es §
431 (1935).
8. The prerogative power was exercised by the sign manual of the crown, that is,
by direction of the monarch under his signature, on the suggestion of the attorney
general. Originally the chancellor simply ordered the disposition of the property as
directed by the crown, but, in time, the power was delegated to the king's council
and finally to the chancellor as keeper of the king's conscience. BoGESIT, op. cit. supra
note 7, § 432; FIscH, THE Cy PlS DocTmrnE iN THE UNrSED STATmS 56-61 (1950).
9. The reason for the exercise of such power by the crown was that charity was an
expiation of sin and would be rewarded in the "hereafter." If for some reason the
gift failed, the benefit of having made the gift should not be lost to the testator.
Thus, applying the gift to another charitable purpose was equally beneficial and
.effective in entitling the testator to the same reward. Attorney General v. Lady Down-
ing, Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1767). See 4 Scorr, TRuSTS § 399.1 (2d ed.
1956). With this reasoning and the fact that the crown had no legal duty to abide by
the intent of the testator, it is understandable why dispositions were at times far
different from the gift originally intended. In one case, the testator left a gift to
establish a Jesuba, an assembly for reading the Jewish law and instructing people in
the Jewish religion. Since no gifts could be given to promote any other than the
state religion at that time, the king exercised his prerogative power and directed the
fund to be applied to the support of a preacher in a foundling hospital to instruct
the children in the tenets of Christianity. Da Costa v. De Pas, Amb. 228, 27 Eng.
Rep. 150 (Ch. 1754).
10. Consideration of charitable gifts for an illegal purpose has only academic in-
terest now since most such gifts were illegal because they were given to a religion
other than the state religion. Fisc,, op. cit. supra note 8, at 57-58 & n.53.
11. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1803), aff'd, 113
Ves. 416, 33 Eng. Rep. 350 (Ch. 1807). See also BoCEnT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 432;
FiscH, op. cit. supra note 8, 56-61; Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J.
303, 305-07 (1939).
12. See BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 434. For an opinion of Justice Holmes which
might lead one to a contrary conclusion see Minot v. Baker, 147 Mass. 348, 17 N.E.
839 (1888).
-13. In only a few states have the courts said that the doctrine is not a part of the
law of the state: Arizona: In re Hayward's Estate, 65 Ariz. 228, 178 P.2d 547 (1947);
Mississippi: National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167 Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933);
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charitable purpose cannot be carried out because of impracticality,
impossibility, or illegality, but the settlor has manifested a general
charitable intent, the courts will direct the application of the trust
property to another charitable purpose, as close as possible to that
designated by the settlor.14 A small minority of jurisdictions,'5 how-
ever, do not accept the doctrine, reasoning either that (1) any doctrine
of cy pres is based on the prerogative power of the crown and thus
is not within equity jurisdiction, or that (2) judicial cy pres, like the
prerogative power, is unrestricted and can be applied arbitrarily, dis-
regarding the intent of the testator, and is therefore an unsound doc-
trine.16 Nevertheless, some of these same courts will, by a process of
construction, reach a result similar to that reached when ey pres is
applied.17 Thus, where a donee of a charitable gift ceases to exist prior
to the vesting of the gift, the majority view is that the cy pres doctrine
applies to save the gift,18 while the minority say that the general
intent of the settlor is determinative and that the trust will not fail if
that intent can be carried out.' 9
Agreeing with appellee's contention that the cy pres doctrine does
not apply in Tennessee, the court in the instant case stated that a court
of equity does not have the peculiar powers exercised by the chan-
cellor in England as a representative of the crown. The ey pres doc-
trine, however, according to the court, refers only to the prerogative
power, and not to the rules of liberal judicial construction of charitable
trusts which have always been a part of the inherent jurisdiction of the
court of chancery 20 One such rule of construction, says the court, is
that a charitable trust, valid except for an impracticable method of
North Carolina: Woodcock v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 214 N.C. 224, 199 S.E.:20
(1938); South Carolina: Furman Univ. v. McLeod, 238 S.C. 475, 120 S.E.2d 865
(1961); City of Columbia v. Monteith, 139 S.C. 262, 137 S.E. 727 (1927); Tennessee:
Bell v. Shannon, 367 S.W.2d 761 (Tenn. 1963); Henshaw v. Flenniken, 183 Tenn.
232, 191 S.W.2d 541 (1946).
14.,-.For other definitions, see 14 C.J.S._ Charities § 52 (1939); RESTATEmN
(SEcOND), TRUSTS § 399 (1959); 4 ScorT,.TrusTs § 399, at 2825 (2d ed. 1956).
15. See note 13, supra.
16. BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 433, at 331; FYscir, op. cit. -supra note 8, at 61.
17. Furman Univ. -v. McLeod, supra note 13; Mars v. Gibert, 93. S.C. 445, 77 S.E.
131 (1913); Henshaw v. Flenniken, supra note 13. Contra, National -Bank of Greece v.
Savarika, supra note 13; Woodcock v.. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., supra note 13.
18. See, e.g., In re William's Estate, 59 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1952); Kentucky Children's
Home v. Woods, 289 Ky. 20, 157 S.W.2d 473 (1941); Miller v. Merchantile-Safe
Deposit '& Trust Co., 24 Md. 380, 168 A.2d 184 (1961); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Ackerman, 18 N.J. Super. 314, 87 A.2d 47 (Ch. 1952); New York City Mission
Soc'y v. Board of Pensions of Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 261 App. Div. 823,
24 N.Y.S.2d 395, appeal denied, 261 App. Div: 932, 26 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1941); In re
Stouffer's Trust, 188 Ore. 218, 215 P.2d 374 (1950).
19. Mars v. Gibert, -supra note 17. See generally note 17 supra.




execution indicated by the testator, will be sustained by the court.2 1
The primary purpose of the present testator was, in the court's opinion,
to aid the orphaned children of the members of the fraternity, and not
the specific orphan's home; therefore the geographic designation by the
settlor did not negative a general charitable intent. The gift would,
therefore, be sustained.2
In reaching this result, the court, while denying the existence of the
cy pres doctrine, found (1) that the testator manifested a general
charitable intent, 3 (2) that the specific charitable purpose was im-
possible,2 4 and (3) that the trust was otherwise valid.P These are the
same three factors which are required for the application of judicial
cy pres as that doctrine has been developed in the United States.p
Thus the court actually applied cy pres while denying its existence in
Tennessee. This anomalous situation results from the court's failure
to differentiate between the two aspects of the doctrine, treating the
term "cy pres" as if it applied to only the prerogative power.n27 It may
be thought that the name is unimportant so long as it is established
that the courts will in essence apply cy pres. However, denominating
the doctrine as one of "liberal rules of judicial construction"7 could
cause some courts to decide that in order to sustain the validity of a
charitable trust whose designated purpose has failed the donor must
have had an actual intent that the gift be redirected to another charita-
ble purpose. The doctrine of cy pres, on the other hand, requires only
that the donor have had a general charitable intent. Furthermore,
when a doctrine has been recognized by a certain name for several
hundred years it is difficult to justify changing that name. To create a
21. Id. at 850.
22. ibid.
23. ibid.
24. Id. at 847.
25. Id. at 850.
26. All states, including Tennessee, have adopted the English common law and
English statutes passed before the fourth year of James I (1607). This presumably
includes the doctrine of judicial cy pres as it developed at common law. See, e.g.,
TENN. CONsT. art. 11, § 1 (1956).
27. "The tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal rules,
and in connection with more than one purpose, has and should have precisely the
same scope in all of them runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of
original sin and must constantly be guarded against." Coox, THE LoercAL AND L=AL
BAsES or TrE CoNrmLc'r OF LAws 159 (1942).
28. Id. at 849-50. In distinguishing between cy pres and 'liberal rules of judicial
construction" the court cites a section in an encyclopedia explaining the application of
cy pres. 10 Am. Jun. Charities § 125 (1937). When the words 'liberal rules of
judicial construction" appear in that section, however, they refer to the doctrine of
judicial cy pres as distinguished from prerogative cy pres, rather than an altogether
separate doctrine. Thus the court has actually stated that it is applying cy pres, al-
though it attempts to distinguish its 'liberal rules" from cy pres. "A rose by any other
nane ....
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new label for an established doctrine can lead only to confusion and
unnecessary complexity, whereas the law should be functional and
clear, never introducing complexity unless absolutely necessary to
implement more important policy considerations.
